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Legislating in the Light: Considering




Consumer advocates and policymakers call for abolition of pre-
dispute arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, while propo-
nents of arbitration claim such abolition would increase compa-
nies' dispute resolution costs, leading to higher prices and
interest rates. Policymakers on both sides of the debate, how-
ever, rarely consider the empirical research necessary for craft-
ing informed arbitration disclosure rules. This article therefore
focuses on how varied research, including my own empirical
studies, may inform policies regarding arbitration disclosure
regulations. The article also offers suggestions for regulations
tailored to have the most impact for the cost in light of this
research.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Companies increasingly include arbitration clauses among the
"modular" terms cobbled into boilerplate contracts.' Consumers al-
ready skeptical of the market assume such boilerplate is nonnegoti-
able and skewed toward the companies' interests.2 Commentators
and policymakers worry that pre-dispute arbitration clauses rob con-
sumers of their judicial recourse rights without knowing consent and
unfairly advantage corporate "repeat players" who routinely include
arbitration clauses in their form consumer contracts. 3 These critics
add that companies use these clauses to curb consumer remedies, bar
class actions, and shield the public from information regarding
safety, disclosure, and other statutory violations. 4 Some also argue
that this essentially allows companies to create private law.5
1. See Todd D. Rakoff, The Law and Sociology of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1235, 1240 (2006) (highlighting how "'boilerplate' has itself taken on a cultural mean-
ing" that translates into a signal that such form terms are not negotiable, especially
with respect to arbitration clauses).
2. Id. at 1241 (discussing sociological impacts of form contracts).
3. See Jean R. Sternlight, Consumer Arbitration, in ARBITRATION LAW IN
AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 127, 129-40 (2006) (highlighting American law's
enforcement of mandatory consumer arbitration under pre-dispute form contracts).
4. See Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U.
KAN. L. REv. 1211, 1212-13 (2007) (discussing privacy in arbitration).
5. See Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law
Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 704, 704-712, 754 (1999) (discussing how "arbi-
tration privatizes the creation of law"); see also Amy J. Schmitz, Mobile-Home Mania?
Protecting Procedurally Fair Arbitration in a Consumer Microcosm, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON
[Vol. 15:115
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Nonetheless, courts in the United States usually enforce these
clauses under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") 6 and efficiency-fo-
cused contract law.7 Proponents of this regime highlight how arbitra-
tion clauses can be "fair" and foster satisfying proceedings for
companies and individuals. In addition, some arbitration-adminis-
tering institutions have taken steps toward protecting procedural
fairness for consumers and employees who often lack the resources of
their corporate opponents. Some therefore claim that arbitration
critics overreact to tales of unfairness in seeking to enact broad legis-
lative bans on arbitration clauses.
Still, strong arguments remain for regulating consumer arbitra-
tion. I have been among those who have critiqued harsh consumer
arbitration provisions, and I have proposed that the existing dispute
resolution template of the Magnuson Moss Warranty Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act ("MMWA")8 should incorporate con-
sumer arbitration reforms to protect consumers' access to warranty
remedies and clarify how MMWA claims may be arbitrated fairly.9 I
also have urged policymakers to transform the "shoulds" of the 1998
Consumer Due Process Protocol, proposed bythe American Arbitra-
tion Association and others through the National Consumer Disputes
Advisory Committee, into legislative "musts" that would survive FAA
preemption. 10 The Protocol suggests procedural fairness "shoulds"
including: clear notice of arbitration clauses and how to obtain infor-
mation regarding the arbitration process, preservation of consumers'
Disp. RESOL. 291, 313-15, 371 (2005) (discussing how manufacturers' use of form arbi-
tration agreements has privatized dispute resolution in the mobile home industry).
6. Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006) (covering domestic
arbitration), §§ 201-208 (implementing the Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New York Convention")), §§ 301-307 (imple-
menting the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration
("Panama Convention")). See also Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91
(2001) (emphasizing the "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements").
7. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Re-
turn of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19
OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 757, 812-13 (2004) (highlighting restrained application of
unconscionability in the wake of rising formalism).
8. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act,
Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (2006)).
9. Amy J. Schmitz, Curing Consumers' Warranty Woes Through Regulated Arbi-
tration, 23 Omo ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 627, 627-32, 661-86 (2008) [hereinafter
Schmitz, Warranty Woes] (discussing need for procedural protections in consumer ar-
bitration proceedings); Amy J. Schmitz, Dangers of Deference to Form Arbitration Pro-
visions, 8 NEV. L.J. 37, 37-55 (2007) [hereinafter Schmitz, Deference] (advancing
procedural regulation of arbitration in lieu of precluding arbitration).
10. National Consumer Disputes Advisory Committee, Consumer Due Process
Protocol, http://www.adr.orgtsp.asp?id=22019 (last visited Feb. 12, 2010).
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access to small claims court, and measures ensuring "reasonable cost
to consumers" and "reasonably convenient" hearing locations."
The potential value of precluding or regulating arbitration
clauses is nonetheless unclear. This is largely due to the lack of em-
pirical data regarding consumer arbitration clauses and consumers'
related contracting behavior. 12 Furthermore, policymakers propose
policies in the dark by failing to consider existing empirical data that
is critical to crafting effective and efficient arbitration reforms.13
Even the limited research available suggests that a broad ban on pre-
dispute arbitration agreements is unwarranted. There is evidence
that many companies do not use or abuse arbitration clauses in their
consumer contracts and that consumers often prevail in arbitration
proceedings.' 4 Nonetheless, narrower regulation may be warranted
to address some companies' use of onerous arbitration clauses to limit
remedies and preclude class proceedings to consumers'
disadvantage.' 5
11. Id.
12. See Shmuel I. Becher & Esther Unger-Aviram, Myth and Reality in Con-
sumer Contracting Behavior (Aug. 4, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, available at
SSRN: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1443908) (highlighting
lack of empirical data and policymakers' consideration of that data in designing con-
tract reforms, relying instead on theoretical assumptions). This is subject to the tan-
dem need for more research regarding the cognitive processes that underlie
individuals' "fairness" judgments. Maureen L. Ambrose & Carol T. Kulik, How Do I
Know That's Fair? A Categorization Approach to Fairness Judgments, in RESEARCH
IN SOCIAL ISSUES IN MANAGEMENT: THEORETICAL AND CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES ON OR-
GANIZATIONAL JUSTICE 35, 37-43 (S.W. Gilliland et al. eds., 2001). But see Christopher
R. Drahozal, Contracting Out of the Uniform Commercial Code: Is Arbitration Law-
less?, 40 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 187, 200-201 (2006) (correctly noting that survey responses
regarding why people behave as they do "must be taken with a grain of salt").
13. See Joseph P. Mulholland, Behavioral Economics and the Federal Trade
Commission 12-15 (Dec. 12, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, available at SSRN:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1091745) (discussing the FTC's
failure to fully consider empirical research in crafting policies and evaluating the ef-
fectiveness of consumer remedies).
14. See infra Part III.C (discussing studies indicating fair use of arbitration and
benefits of arbitration for consumers).
15. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: An Empirical
Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 871, 879-93 (2008) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al., Summer Soldiers]; The-
odore Eisenberg et al., Mandatory Arbitration for Customers but Not for Peers: A
Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Non-Consumer Contracts, 92 JUDICA-
TURE 118, 118-23 (2008) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al., Mandatory Arbitration] (dis-
cussing the same study, noting conflicting research, and finding in this study of 21
large companies' contracts that companies' targeted use of arbitration clauses in only
their consumer contracts indicated motivation to avoid aggregate proceedings and
perhaps all liability).
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A more measured approach may be to regulate the content of
clauses and procedures applicable to consumer arbitration. 16 Al-
though there are a variety of options for such regulation, this article
will focus on one initial step: requiring special notice and disclosure
provisions for pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer con-
tracts.17 I have been among those calling for heightened disclosure
regulations, which garner support from voluntary consent notions
underlying promise enforcement theory.' 8 Emphasis on disclosure is
reflected in the 2008 Farm Bill, which permits a producer or grower
to opt out of arbitration before entering a contract and requires "con-
spicuous disclosure" of this opt-out right. 19 Some courts also have
interpreted fiduciary duties to require heightened disclosure and ex-
planation of arbitration terms even where those terms appear in the
same contract that created the fiduciary relationship. 20
Although arbitration notice or disclosure regulations are not
overly intrusive, they should not be adopted without due regard for
how they may increase company costs. In addition, it would be im-
prudent to interfere with contractual freedom for no reason, and arbi-
tration disclosures would not be worth their costs if consumers ignore
them regardless of how conspicuously companies state them in their
contracts. At the same time, disclosure regulations may have more
meaning and impact if they go beyond conspicuous notice to include
affirmative duties to educate consumers regarding the arbitration
process and its potential impacts on their rights. That said, it is un-
clear that consumers will take the time to read, listen to, or care
16. See Schmitz, Warranty Woes, supra note 9, at 661-86 (discussing a variety of
procedural regulations).
17. See Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts 4-5
(N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 91, 2007), available at http://lsr.
nellco.orglnyu-jewp/91/ (noting that many support disclosure regulations of some
type, but differ with respect to extent and content of those regulations).
18. See Schmitz, Warranty Woes, supra note 9, at 661-64 (describing my and
other proposals for such disclosures).
19. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 ("Farm Bill"), Pub. L. 110-246,
§ 210, 122 Stat. 1651 (June 18, 2008) (codified at 7 U.S.C.A. § 197c (West 2010)). The
Farm Bill added a new section on the use of arbitration agreements to Title II of the
Packers and Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-231 (2006) (also providing the grower a
right to opt into arbitration after a dispute arises if both parties agree in writing).
20. See Daly v. U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray, Inc., No. 04-490, 2005 WL 590076, at
*1 (Mont. Mar. 15, 2005) (unpublished table decision) (holding that a pre-dispute arbi-
tration clause in a client/broker account agreement was unenforceable even if the cli-
ent would have separately signed the arbitration clause because this same account
agreement gave rise to the broker's fiduciary duty to fully explain the arbitration
clause in that agreement).
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about information pertaining to resolution of future claims they do
not foresee at the time of the transaction.
Design and implementation of arbitration disclosure regulations
therefore depend on deep and nuanced empirical research, not simply
doctrinal or theoretical assumptions. 21 This article therefore high-
lights this need by discussing the existing empirical data, including
my own, and suggests how this data may be used to tailor regulations
that will have the most impact for the costs. It also calls for further
research to test these ideas and generate more enlightened arbitra-
tion reforms.
Part II sets the stage with discussion of the law, theory, and pol-
icy guiding current enforcement and critiques of arbitration clauses
in consumer contracts. Part III describes the empirical research that
has focused on either comparing contract terms or arbitration out-
comes and satisfaction. However, this research has not explored con-
sumer contracting with respect to arbitration clauses. Part IV
therefore discusses my research exploring this area. This includes
my findings from consumer focus groups, a collection of arbitration
clauses in wireless phone service and credit card contracts, and re-
sponses to a survey administered over the Internet that relate to
whether consumers read, understand, or even care about arbitration
clauses. Part V offers suggestions for arbitration disclosure regula-
tions in light of this and others' research. The article concludes with
a call for more deep and varied research aimed to guide arbitration
policy design.
II. SYNOPSIS OF CONSUMER ARBITRATION LAw, THEORY, AND POLICY
A. Arbitration Law
International and domestic arbitration laws generally require
enforcement of valid agreements to arbitrate and their incorporation
of rules such as those promulgated by the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation ("AAA"), the International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC"), or
the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"). 22 This rele-
gates enforcement analysis to contract formation and validity issues,
which courts have mainly approached in a formalistic and efficiency-
21. This article does not rehash well-covered policy arguments regarding the en-
forcement of consumer arbitration generally, or all possible regulations of arbitration
contracts and procedures. Instead, it focuses on consumer arbitration notice reforms
and the need for empirical research to craft informed policy.
22. Richard E. Speidel, Common Legal Issues in American Arbitration Law, in
ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITicAL ASSESSMENT 29, 31-34 (2006).
[Vol. 15:115
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focused manner. 23 Proponents of arbitration argue that enforcement
results in cost and time savings, while critics complain that it impairs
consumer remedies and essentially allows companies to privatize law
and avoid regulation through their arbitration programs.
24
1. Broad Arbitration Statutes
On the international level, the widely-adopted New York Con-
vention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards generally mandates summary enforcement of arbitration
agreements and awards.25 The United States has implemented this
Convention through Chapter Two of the FAA,26 which U.S. courts
have applied with a pro-enforcement glaze aimed to promote both ar-
bitration and international comity.27 This glaze has also led courts to
narrowly read the Convention's allowance for public policy review of
arbitration awards to protect the discretion of arbitrators, and to cur-
tail judicial power to mandate particular arbitration procedures or
contract formation standards.
Courts have similarly enforced domestic arbitration agreements
under the FAA Chapter One 28 and its state counterpart, the Uniform
23. See Schmitz, Warranty Woes, supra note 9, at 635-36 (discussing preemption
and its impact on arbitration challenges).
24. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Su-
preme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 637 (1996)
(critiquing companies' inclusion of arbitration clauses in consumer and employment
contracts); Joel Seligman, The Quiet Revolution: Securities Arbitration Confronts the
Hard Questions, 33 Hous. L. REV. 327 (1996) (discussing the mandatory nature of
arbitration under NASD or NYSE rules in broker-dealer securities contracts).
25. ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 67 (3d ed. 1999); THE NEW YORK CONVENTION ON THE REC-
OGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS, Articles 1-16 (1958), re-
printed in id. at 491-94 (including Appendix) [hereinafter NY CONVENTION]; United
Nations Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"), Status: 1958 - Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, http://www.uncitral.
org/uncitral/enluncitraltexts/arbitrationNYConventionstatus.html (last visited
Feb. 26, 2010) (noting 144 countries had adopted the Convention).
26. FAA, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2006) (implementing the New York Convention),
§§ 301-307 (implementing the Panama Convention).
27. Kenneth F. Dunham, International Arbitration is Not Your Father's Oldsmo-
bile Convention, 2 J. DisP. RESOL. 323, 326-27 (2005) (discussing the development of
international commercial arbitration and noting the importance of the New York Con-
vention in that development); id. at 330-31 (discussing importance of contract terms
and rules incorporated therein in dictating the arbitration procedures); NY CONVEN-
TION, supra note 25, at Arts. 1-16.
28. FAA, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
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Arbitration Act ("UAA"). 29 These laws require courts to specifically
enforce domestic arbitration agreements, and they augment this
mandate with provisions for liberal venue, immediate appeal from or-
ders adverse to arbitration, appointment of arbitrators if parties can-
not do so by agreement, limited review of arbitration awards, and
treatment of awards as final judgments. 30 Furthermore, the Su-
preme Court's holding that the FAA preempts states from singling
out arbitration for special treatment or otherwise hindering the en-
forcement of arbitration in contracts affecting interstate commerce
leaves states with little power to regulate consumer arbitration provi-
sions beyond application of general contract defenses. 31
Drafters of form consumer contracts therefore have great power
in dictating arbitration provisions and procedures. 3 2 They may pro-
vide for ad hoc arbitration they administer themselves, or they may
incorporate some or all of the procedural rules promulgated by ad-
ministering institutions such as the AAA, ICC, or NASD.33 The insti-
tutions' rules generally cover hearing location, arbitrator
appointment, discovery, fees and costs, and other such basics, and
they may provide for special procedures in consumer cases. 34 For ex-
ample, the AAA's Commercial Arbitration Rules require parties to
29. Uniform Arbitration Act ("UAA"), 7 U.L.A. § 1 (1997). The UAA is model leg-
islation that nearly all states have adopted to require the same basic enforcement for
local arbitration agreements and awards beyond the purview of the FAA. Id.
30. See Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration's Finality
Through Functional Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 124-35 (2002) (discussing the
FAA's pro-efficiency remedial provisions).
31. See Doctor's Assocs. Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (finding the FAA
preempted state notice requirements for arbitration clauses); Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (holding the FAA preempted Alabama law limit-
ing consumer arbitration); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding
that the FAA applies in federal and state court).
32. See Steven J. Ware, Interstate Arbitration: Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act, in ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 88, 88-126 (2006)
(also proposing reforms aimed at solidifying the contractual approach).
33. See Dunham, supra note 27, at 330-40 (discussing the arbitration rules of the
AAA, ICC, and others).
34. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N ("AAA") COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES
AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES (2007), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440;
AAA Supp. PROCEDURES FOR CONSUMER-RELATED DISPUTES (2005), available at http:l!
www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22014.
122 [Vol. 15:115
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split potentially high hearing costs, while AAA's Supplementary Pro-
cedures for Consumer-Related Disputes cap consumers' costs at dif-
ferent levels depending on the amount of their claims. 35
2. Applicable Contract Law
Contract defenses are the primary means for arbitration regula-
tion in the wake of U.S. Supreme Court rulings rejecting arguments
that form arbitration clauses overly burden statutory rights.
3 6
Courts now enforce arbitration of statutory claims covering discrimi-
nation, consumer lending, consumer warranties, and securities.
37
This generally has included consumer protection claims under the
MMWA, even when arbitration clauses require consumers to pay pro-
cedure costs that could equal or exceed the amounts of their claims.3 8
Furthermore, courts have agreed that arbitration of statutory claims
does not constitute state action subject to due process requirements
of the U.S. Constitution.3 9
35. Compare AAA COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES R-49
to R-51 (2007), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440, with AAA SuPP. PRO-
CEDURES FOR CONSUMER-RELATED DISPUTES C-8 (2005), available at http://www.
adr.org/sp.asp?id=22014.
36. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (finding
statutory age discrimination statute could be subject to arbitration); EEOC v. Luce,
Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 748-55 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (finding
that Title VII did not preclude enforcement of an arbitration clause in an employment
contract); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104, 1108-1110 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding that the clause at issue was not unconscionable because the employee could
opt out of the arbitration program).
37. See id. See also Randolph, 531 U.S. at 91 (finding Truth in Lending Act
("TILA") claims under a consumer financing agreement may be subject to binding
arbitration under the FAA); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490
U.S. 477, 485 (1989) (overruling prior opinion to hold securities claims arbitrable);
Schmitz, supra note 5, at 326-34 (discussing courts' general allowance for arbitration
of MMWA rights).
38. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1147-50 (7th Cir. 1997) (enforcing
arbitration clause although the ICC rules incorporated therein curtailed the Hills'
access to needed discovery and required them to pay roughly $4,000 in initial costs to
pursue their warranty claims on a $4,000 computer). But see Klocek v. Gateway, Inc.,
104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1341 (D. Kan. 2000) (refusing to follow Hill regarding enforce-
ment of same clause). The Supreme Court has left open a small window for case-
specific arguments that high filing costs may be invalid where they will prevent an
impoverished individual from vindicating her statutory rights. See Randolph, 531
U.S. at 91 (holding TILA claims arbitrable despite possibly high arbitration costs but
leaving open the possibility for such claims where one sufficiently proves inability to
cover the costs); Bailey v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 346 F.3d 821, 823-24 (8th Cir.
2003) (finding cost challenges must be submitted to the arbitrator under the parties'
agreement).
39. See Maureen A. Weston, Universes Colliding: The Constitutional Implications
of Arbitral Class Actions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1711, 1714-23, 1745-1762 (2006)
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Even if consumers successfully argue that an arbitration agree-
ment's preclusion of rights such as class relief, recovery of punitive
damages, or recovery of attorney fees prevents them from asserting
their statutory rights, they often must still arbitrate their tort and
contract claims. 40 In addition, courts may informally push parties
toward arbitrating cases requiring potentially high administration
fees by signaling that they will enforce the arbitration clause if the
corporation agrees to pay arbitration filing fees.41 Courts also may
order consumers to arbitrate warranty claims against some, but not
all, of the parties who may bear responsibility for the claims. 42
This leaves consumer challenges of arbitration clauses to con-
tract defenses, such as lack of consideration, fraud, and unconsciona-
bility.43  Furthermore, courts following the Supreme Court's
"separability" mandate will only consider these challenges when they
are aimed at the arbitration clause itself, and not the underlying con-
tract as a whole.44 At the same time, these arbitration clause chal-
lenges are often unsuccessful. Lack of consideration challenges, for
example, usually fail because it is sufficient if an arbitration provi-
sion is mutual, is among an exchange of various contract promises, or
is added pursuant to an initial contract allowing for additions.45
(noting U.S. courts' conclusion that private arbitration does not involve state action,
but critiquing this conclusion with respect to arbitral class actions).
40. Browne v. Kline Tysons Imports, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 827, 828-33 (E.D. Va.
2002) (allowing litigation of MMWA claims, but ordering arbitration of TILA and state
statutory and common law claims arising out of car sale).
41. See, e.g., Phillips v. Assocs. Home Equity Servs., Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d 840,
847-48 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (finding that an individual plaintiff could not be compelled to
arbitrate if required to bear the prohibitive arbitration costs but stating that the court
would reconsider its ruling if the defendants agreed to pay these costs).
42. Compare Ex parte Gates, 675 So. 2d 371, 374-75 (Ala. 1996) (enforcing arbi-
tration against a consumer on behalf of non-signatory manufacturer based on broad
arbitration clause) with Ex parte Jones, 686 So. 2d 1166, 1166-68 (Ala. 1996) (conclud-
ing there was no agreement to arbitrate between consumers and the non-signatory to
the arbitration agreement).
43. See Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REV. 695, 695-97 (describing courts' enforcement of arbitration clauses generally).
44. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967)
(finding courts may only consider attacks on an arbitration clause and not those
aimed at a underlying contract); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S.
440, 443-49 (2006) (clarifying that this separability rule is a matter of federal law and
that an arbitrator must decide claims that the contract was illegal).
45. See Hawkins v. Aid Assoc. for Lutherans, 338 F.3d 801, 808 (7th Cir. 2003)
(finding initial contract terms allowing for later changes provided consideration for
later-added arbitration clause). See also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping and
Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Arbitral Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62
BROOK. L. REV. 1381, 1382-86 (1996) (critiquing the courts' failure to require "mean-
ingful consent").
[Vol. 15:115124
Spring 2010] Legislating in the Light 125
Fraud and misrepresentation claims similarly fail due to the heavy
burden of proving that the consumer accepted the arbitration clause
due to a knowing or recklessly-made false material representation
about arbitration. 46 In addition, assent challenges face high hurdles
because most courts agree that consumers are responsible for reading
their contracts and there is no duty to inform consumers explicitly
about arbitration provisions. 4 7
Some courts have nonetheless been more receptive to consumers'
challenges of arbitration agreements based on unconscionability. 48
Some have found pre-printed form provisions offered without negoti-
ation unconscionable when they include suspect terms such as
"carve-outs" that give the drafter an option to litigate, cost and fee
allocations that overly burden one party, extremely inconvenient lo-
cation selections, and remedy limitations that gut statutory claims.4 9
In one case, for example, the court struck a clause in an arbitration
provision in a consumer sales contract as unconscionable because it
gave the seller sole power to choose the arbitrator.50 The court none-
theless affirmed the trial court's order to arbitrate with a court-ap-
pointed arbitrator.5 1
In addition, some courts have refused to enforce class relief waiv-
ers embedded in consumer arbitration clauses. In Fiser v. Dell Com-
puter Corp.,52 the Supreme Court of New Mexico refused to enforce
an arbitration clause in Dell's computer purchase contracts because
he class action ban was substantively unconscionable and against
state policy. 53 The court found that the consumers' small dollar
46. In re Firstmerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 756-58 (Tex. 2001) (in which con-
sumers challenged arbitration based on fraud, along with unconscionability, duress,
and revocation).
47. See Torrance v. Aames Funding Corp., 242 F. Supp. 2d 862, 869-70 (D. Or.
2002) (emphasizing no duty to disclose or explain arm's length written agreements);
Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A License to Deceive: Enforcing Contrac-
tual Myths Despite Consumer Psychological Realities, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 617, 619-
23 (2000) (discussing the court's strict enforcement of form contracts in precluding
fraud challenges of contracts containing disclaimer clauses).
48. See Stempel, supra note 7, at 812-13.
49. See CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOzAL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND
PROBLEMS 113-14 (2002) (listing suspect terms and citing cases supporting and deny-
ing these claims).
50. Harold Allen's Mobile Home Factory Outlet, Inc. v. Butler, 825 So. 2d 779,
780-81 (Ala. 2002) (citing the provision and finding the transaction also was
adhesive).
51. Id. at 785.
52. Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., 188 P.3d 1215 (N.M. 2008).
53. Id. at 1217-22.
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claims would not be worth pursuing in individual arbitration pro-
ceedings, and therefore the consumers needed to join their claims in a
class action to effectively vindicate their rights.54 Quoting from an-
other opinion, the court emphasized that without a class action, "only
a lunatic or a fanatic sues for [ten to twenty dollars.]" 55 The court
used this same reasoning to deny enforcement of the contract's choice
of law clause designating Texas law, which allows class action waiv-
ers; it held that the FAA did not preempt the court's application of
the unconscionability contract defense. 56
Such applications of unconscionability to arbitration clauses risk
FAA preemption if they frustrate enforcement of these clauses in con-
tracts affecting interstate commerce. Furthermore, many courts ap-
ply the unconscionability doctrine in pro-arbitration and efficiency-
focused fashions and consequently reject unconscionability claims, as
well as other contract challenges of arbitration clauses. 57 The court
in Adler v. Dell, Inc., for instance, found the Dell arbitration clause
barring class relief enforceable under Texas and Michigan law.58 The
court noted Dell's assertion that its arbitration provision promotes
affordable prices for its products and rejected the consumers' claims
that the costs of individual arbitration proceedings would effectively
54. Id. at 1218-22 (refusing to follow Texas law allowing for class action waivers
despite a Texas choice of law clause because of New Mexico's fundamental policy of
ensuring a viable mechanism for consumers to assert their rights).
55. Id. at 1220 (quoting Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th
Cir. 2004) and adding language in brackets to the original quote). See also Genevieve
Saumier, Consumer Dispute Resolution: The Evolving Canadian Landscape, 1 CLASs
ACTION DEFENCE Q. 52 (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1291960 (noting
that U.S. states "continue to be thwarted in their attempts to protect consumers' ac-
cess to courts and class actions" due to the FAA, whereas Canadian provinces have
been able to preserve such access through legislation denying effect of arbitration
clauses in consumer contracts).
56. Fiser, 188 P.3d at 1222. This reasoning is somewhat suspect. The court ad-
mits that the contract was not adhesive and simply states substantive unconsciona-
bility as a conclusion after an exhaustive analysis based on "fundamental New Mexico
policy." Id. at 1221-22. Furthermore, the court used this policy to disregard the
Texas choice of law provision in the contracts. Id. at 1218-21.
57. See, e.g., Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v. Gaskamp, 280 F.3d 1069 (5th Cir. 2002)
(denying an unconscionability challenge to an arbitration agreement); Johnnie's
Homes, Inc. v. Holt, 790 So. 2d 956, 963-65 (Ala. 2003) (enforcing a consumer's duty to
arbitrate warranty, fraud, breach, and other claims); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Lewis,
813 So. 2d 820 (Ala. 2001) (denying an unconscionability challenge to an arbitration
clause by an illiterate consumer).
58. Adler v. Dell, Inc., No. 08-CV-13170, 2008 WL 5351042, at *1-13 (E.D. Mich.
Dec. 18, 2008) (noting that applying Texas law under the choice of law clause allowed
for enforcement of the class action waiver "[elven if Michigan could be said to have a
'fundamental interest' in prohibiting contractual class action waiver provisions").
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preclude their vindication of small claims.5 9 The court also empha-
sized that consumers bear the burden of reading and comparing sell-
ers' contract terms and should shop elsewhere if they do not want to
abide by Dell's arbitration provision. 60
Many courts have enforced consumer arbitration clauses assum-
ing companies pass cost savings from arbitration programs on to con-
sumers through lower prices and higher quality.61 Such assumptions
pervade opinions like Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., in which the court
enforced an arbitration provision in terms that came with a computer
consumers had purchased over the phone. 62 In finding that the con-
sumers assented to arbitration by failing to return the computer
within thirty days, the Hill court fostered a judicial sentiment that
form contracts promote efficiency regardless of whether consumers
take the time to read or negotiate them.6 3 The court also failed to
find the arbitration provision unconscionable, even though the con-
tract created potentially high proceeding costs and curtailed class ac-
tion relief on MMWA claims.6 4
Consumers therefore face an uncertain and limited likelihood of
success in challenging arbitration clauses in the courts. Contract de-
fenses remain the most viable means for challenging arbitration
clauses, but courts often apply these defenses in formalistic and effi-
ciency-focused fashions to deny consumers' arbitration challenges.
Meanwhile, other courts apply defenses in uncertain or seemingly
59. Id. at *6-8 (also rejecting claims that NAF arbitration proceedings are inher-
ently unfair toward consumers).
60. Id. at *9-10 (rejecting Adler's claims that it was unreasonable to expect him
to read and compare contracts). The court left open the possibility that a different
standard may apply to an "unsophisticated consumer" by distinguishing Adler based
on the fact he was an attorney. It also distinguished this case from others in which
the contract terms were not provided to consumers prior to completing purchases. Id.
61. See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1147-50 (finding customer assent to a form arbitration
clause). See also Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Con-
tracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 435-51, 485-87 (2002) (explain-
ing why electronic contracts are not adhesion contracts and discussing the efficiency
benefits of standard form contracts).
62. See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1147-50 (enforcing form computer purchase contract re-
quiring arbitration under ICC rules). But see Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676
N.Y.S.2d 569, 572-76 (App. Div. 1998) (enforcing the identical Gateway arbitration
clause, but vacating the portion of the clause requiring arbitration before the ICC due
to the "excessive cost factor that is necessarily entailed in arbitrating before the
ICC').
63. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149 (stating that "approve-or-return" provisions such as
that in Hill make consumers better off "as a group").
64. Id. More uncertainty has been fueled by indication that antitrust claims of
collusively imposing arbitration clauses on consumers may have some viability. See
Ross v. Bank of America, N.A., 524 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2008).
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anti-arbitration ways that are vulnerable to FAA preemption chal-
lenges. The sum of litigation and unclear law breeds judicial ineffi-
ciency and consumer skepticism toward arbitration and highlights
some companies' onerous clauses. It also harms companies' ability to
rely on arbitration for cost savings that they may pass on through
lower prices and higher quality products and services.
B. Theory and Policy Background
At the time of initial contracting, parties generally focus on key
terms such as price, timing, and performance standards. They usu-
ally pay little attention to arbitration or other dispute resolution pro-
visions unless they are especially cognizant or concerned with
eventual problems or disputes.65 Economic theory suggests that this
is usually efficient and cost-effective because it saves the contracting
parties from wasting resources wrangling over details of future sanc-
tions and dispute resolution proceedings they hope never to use.66
Rational Design theory similarly posits that parties are more likely to
include arbitration or tailored dispute resolution procedures drawing
on external delegation in agreements involving complex or costly
issues.67
At the same time, some economic theorists presuppose a rational
actor who has the opportunity to read and consider form contract
terms and conduct a cost/benefit analysis. 68 They therefore conclude
that courts should not hinder form contracts' efficiency by devoting
time or other resources to questioning whether the adhering parties
truly assented to form terms.69 Formalist courts and commentators
65. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55, 55-56, 60-62 (1963) (finding in his early-1960s study of
business relations that parties usually focus on "description, contingencies, defective
performances and legal sanction").
66. See Tarek F. Abdalla, Litigation vs. Arbitration: Which Is Better for the Com-
mercial Dispute?, PRAc. LITIGATOR, Sept. 2005, at 47, 51, 52 (discussing logic of basic
arbitration clauses). See also Macaulay, supra note 65, at 58-60 (explaining why stan-
dardized contracts without a lot of "red tape" are often cost-effective and practical in
business exchanges).
67. Barbara Koremenos, If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute
Resolution Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining?, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (2007)
(testing Rational Design theory in analyzing the frequency of dispute resolution provi-
sions in international agreements).
68. Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L.
& POL'Y REV. 233, 233-35, 255-56, 262-63 (2002) (emphasizing courts' failure to re-
dress oppressive or unreasonable consumer contracts due to rigid adhesion to Profes-
sor Lef's two-prong procedural/substantive test).
69. Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Con-
tract Law, 71 FoRDHAM L. REV. 761, 771-75 (2002) (critiquing this view); see also
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apply this theory and its tenets to form contracts by assuming con-
sent and strictly enforcing form arbitration provisions without truly
considering contextual and relational factors. 70
Scholars have further used the law and economics model for pre-
dicting human responses to legal incentives based on this rational
choice theory and the assumption that people act out of economic self-
interest.71 They posit that strict enforcement of form contracts fos-
ters optimal economically efficient exchanges and hence wealth max-
imization. Thus, enforcement of form contracts results in cost
savings companies may pass on to consumers through lower prices,
lower interest rates, or higher quality, regardless of whether consum-
ers actually read these contracts.7 2 As noted above, many courts
have adopted this same view in enforcing arbitration clauses regard-
less of whether parties have in fact read or considered the clauses at
the time of contracting.7 3
Others acknowledge, however, that consumers rarely negotiate
boilerplate that they may not read or understand. 74 Cognitive and
behavioral theories consider more deeply individuals' strong likeli-
hood to accept form terms, including arbitration clauses, without
question. 75 Scholars' research findings confirm individuals' "tunnel
vision," skewed by hindsight and outcome biases that assist digestion
Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet Ju-
risdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345, 1387-90 (2001) (noting that courts generally
enforce forum-selection clauses and that cases protecting consumers from manufac-
turers' contractual specifications of applicable law "are the exception rather than the
rule"); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARv. L.
REV. 1173, 1180-97 (1983) (also critiquing this view and its assumption of adequate
opportunity to read and consent).
70. See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1147-50 (enforcing a form arbitration clause using an
efficiency rationale).
71. See Shinuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form
Contracts, 68 LA. L. REV. 117, 122-23 (2007) (explaining rational choice assumptions
of consumer contracting as well as more nuanced implications of behavioral science);
Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard From Contracts, and Unconsciona-
bility, 70 U. CHi. L. REv. 1203, 1204-06, 1222-25, 1243-44 (2003) (discussing how buy-
ers may not act fully rationally to the extent they do not expend the time and
resources necessary to maximize the accuracy or utility of their choices).
72. See Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agree-
ments - with Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM.
ARB. 251, 254-64, 292 (2006) (proposing that pre-dispute arbitration clauses benefit
companies and consumers).
73. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text (noting formalistic and effi-
ciency-focused application of contract defenses).
74. See Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1240-43.
75. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Re-
moving the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051,
1074-75 (2000) (explaining aim of behavioral law and economics); Becher, supra note
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of vast information, but lead to misperceptions and over-valuations of
that information. 76 In contracting, this may cause individuals to ig-
nore or undervalue arbitration terms, especially when they do not un-
derstand the terms' significance or expect eventual conflicts. 77
Professor Korobkin has suggested that individuals' "bounded" ra-
tionality (human cognition is not perfect; we can be economically irra-
tional) leads them to passively accept terms that operate without the
need for active bargaining, even if those terms are contrary to stan-
dard industry practice or legal defaults. 78 This is the result of not
only contractual "laziness," but also a fear of regretting action that
may breed undesirable results.79 Consumers are therefore predis-
posed to accept arbitration and other form terms that sellers provide
on pre-printed forms that operate without action.80
This propensity is augmented by individuals' fear of "rocking the
boat" or raising thorny issues of eventual disputes during contract
negotiations.8 1 Consumers may be especially reluctant to question
boilerplate arbitration clauses where consumers have an inferior po-
sition in the seller/consumer status hierarchy.8 2 Consumers know
that sellers control needed resources and therefore have the power to
offer these resources on the sellers' terms. This means consumers
71, at 123-25 (explaining behavioral law and economics basics). Traditional econom-
ics counters these arguments as difficult to test. See Richard A. Posner, Rational
Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1559-75 (1998)
(critiquing behavioral law and economics as merely a psychological and sociological
account of human behavior that "confuse[s] explanation and prediction" and lacks
"theoretical ambition," and positing that it therefore cannot provide a useful model).
76. See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel
Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 291, 307-22 (discussing various cognitive
biases in the criminal context).
77. See Stark & Choplin, supra note 47, at 676-77 (summarizing cognitive and
social psychological factors hindering consumers from reading or understanding con-
tracts, and noting that consumers enter into contracts assuming no problems will
arise).
78. Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psycho-
logical Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1607-09, 1627
(1998) (advancing "inertia theory" based on his findings that parties have an even
stronger preference for default contract provisions than Coasean theorists might
expect).
79. Id. (explaining how negotiators may avoid potentially deal-breaking depar-
tures from status quo contract terms).
80. Id.
81. See Macaulay, supra note 65, at 60-64 (explaining how detailed negotiations
can turn "a cooperative venture into an antagonistic horse trade" and how "detailed
negotiated contracts can get in the way of creating good exchange relationships be-
tween business units").
82. Larry Bates, Administrative Regulation of Terms in Form Contracts: A Com-
parative Analysis of Consumer Protection, 16 EMORY IN'L L. REV. 1, 29-33 (2002).
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generally accept arbitration terms even when they bar class relief or
other remedies consumers would otherwise want to retain under
common and statutory law.8 3
Some scholars have used these contracting realities to critique
arbitration and other form provisions. They argue that sellers take
advantage of consumers' cognitive errors in dictating impenetrable
form terms.8 4 For example, in opposition to neoclassical economists'
arguments that such legislation is inefficient, Professors Jolls, Sun-
stein, and Thaler have applied behavioral principles to explain why
consumer protection legislation is appropriate to quell significant de-
partures from usual trade and fairness norms.85 They propose that
legislation is necessary to protect consumers from their failure to
guard their needs and long-term interests in the way neoclassical
economists assume due to bounded rationality.8 6
Professor Becher similarly has advanced justification for con-
sumer protections based on psychological and behavioral patterns he
identifies as sunk cost effect, cognitive dissonance, confirmation bias,
and low-ball technique.8 7 He argues that companies take advantage
of individuals' propensities to ignore low-probability risks, to overes-
timate risks regarding recent incidents, and to "under-react to con-
tractual risks" due to consumers' own self-serving overconfidence
about purchasing decisions.88 Becher highlights how psychologists'
"conflict model" for individuals' retreat from stressful situations indi-
cates that consumers likely accept form contracts without reading or
negotiating them due to stressful contracting contexts such as high-
83. Korobkin, supra note 78, at 1627. This gives companies that draft form arbi-
tration provisions considerable power in setting arbitration procedures, especially be-
cause consumers usually do not read or realize the significance of these procedures.
84. Becher, supra note 71, at 123-25.
85. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach
to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) (providing an account of behav-
ioral law and economics theory's foundations and analyzing it in positive, prescrip-
tive, and normative terms, especially with respect to predatory lending laws).
86. Id. at 1476-81, 1546-47 (also expressing hope that economists and lawyers
would incorporate empirical findings into their assumptions, thereby rendering tradi-
tional economics obsolete). But see Posner, supra note 75, at 1559-75 (critiquing be-
havioral theories as "confus[ing] explanation and prediction," lacking "theoretical
ambition," and failing to provide a useful and applicable model); Gregory Mitchell,
Why Law and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral
Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 72-74, 125-132 (2002) (cri-
tiquing the behavioral law and economics view as based on only limited empirical
research and as failing to precisely apply data to account for variation among deci-
sion-makers).
87. Becher, supra note 71, at 124-36 (explaining these various patterns).
88. Id. at 136-50.
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pressure sales tactics and time limitations.8 9 Moreover, the signaling
power of signatures and information overload effects suggest that
consumers are unlikely to give proper weight to electronic contracts
("e-contracts") loaded with form terms.90
At the same time, relational contract theorists have highlighted
the importance of parties' connections and relationships in assessing
the fairness and legitimacy of standardized pre-dispute arbitration
provisions, particularly within close-knit exchange communities.91
Some have discussed the importance of communal culture in ac-
cepting and using private dispute resolution procedures.9 2 I have
therefore proposed that such broad and textured relational factors
may impact parties' differing needs, expectations, and understand-
ings regarding dispute resolution.9 3 These differences may justify ar-
bitration regulations in certain uneven bargaining contexts but may
amount to costly protectionism in other, more communal, contexts.
Pre-dispute arbitration clauses have become a norm in some con-
sumer transactions, and they are generally enforceable. Further-
more, although many clauses contain onerous procedures that curtail
consumer remedies, generally there is no duty to give special notice
89. Id. at 151-64.
90. Id. at 160-78. See also Robert A. Hillman, On-line Consumer Standard Form
Contracting Practices: A Survey and Discussion of Legal Implications, in Is CONSUMER
PROTECTION AN ANACHRONISM IN THE INFORMATION ECONOMY? 283 (Jane K. Winn ed.,
2006) (proposing requirements that electronic businesses make terms available on
their websites, allow for "cooling off" periods, and follow substantive mandatory rules
for forum selection and choice of law provisions).
91. See Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-term Economic Relations
Under Classical, Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854
(1978) (analyzing the importance of the parties' relationships and reputation or good-
will incentives, and hence the "relational" nature, of long-term contracts); Macaulay,
supra note 65, at 55-56, 60-62; Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton
Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 1724 (2001) (exploring the cotton industry's reliance on intra-community rules
and norms, and thus its development and use of a private legal system ("PLS")).
92. See Jeffrey Z. Rubin & Frank E.A. Sander, Culture, Negotiation, and the Eye
of the Beholder, 7 NEGOT. J. 249, 250-53 (1991) (highlighting the importance of cul-
tural differences relating to ethnicity or nationality and recognizing similar differ-
ences due to race, gender, and age). Building on cognitive, behavioral, relational, and
cultural ideas, I have proposed a "contracting culture" continuum that acknowledges
the impacts of dispute resolution provisions in a particular communal context. Amy
J. Schmitz, Consideration of "Contracting Culture" in Enforcing Arbitration Provi-
sions, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 123 (2007).
93. See Schmitz, supra note 92, at 123-72 (contrasting relational factors in com-
mercial construction versus consumer contexts to the extent parties in these different
contexts do or do not share connections and understandings regarding industry norms
and applicable dispute resolution systems).
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or explain these clauses in the absence of a fiduciary relationship. 94
Neoclassical economic theories support strict enforcement of form
contracts, but behavioral and relational realities suggest that con-
sumers do not fit the assumptions of economic rationality. This mix-
ture of law, theory, and reality raises questions regarding the need
for, and design of, arbitration disclosure regulations. Regulations
may be warranted to protect consumers from onerous use of arbitra-
tion, but policymakers should design regulations in light of empirical
data regarding content, contracting, and perceptions of consumer ar-
bitration provisions.
III. THE LANDSCAPE OF EMPIRICAL CONTRACT AND
ARBITRATION RESEARCH
The empirical research on consumer contracting choices and be-
havior is generally limited, especially with respect to arbitration pro-
visions.95 Emerging contract behavior studies merely focus on the
"rationality" of consumers' choices based on monetary differences in
contracts, or correlation of contract terms with market share or as-
sent mechanisms. 96 Meanwhile, arbitration-related studies usually
focus only on outcomes or reported satisfaction of those that have
participated in dispute resolution processes. 97 This has left a re-
search gap regarding consumers' attitudes and behaviors with re-
spect to arbitration clauses in form contracts. My mixed-method and
electronic survey research helps fill that gap.
94. See Torrance v. Aames Funding Corp., 242 F. Supp. 2d 862, 869-70 (D. Or.
2002) (finding no duty to disclose or explain arbitration clauses in arm's length con-
tracts). But see Daly v. U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray, Inc., No. 04-490, 2005 WL 590076,
at *1-2 (Mont. Mar. 15, 2005) (unpublished table decision) (finding broker had a fidu-
ciary duty to his client to explain the impact of a pre-dispute arbitration clause in
their client/broker account agreement).
95. There are marketing studies and some academic studies that consider limited
situations, but these do not truly explore contracting with respect to dispute resolu-
tion clauses. See, e.g., Sumit Agarwal et al., Do Consumers Choose the Right Credit
Contracts? (Nov. 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=843826 (reporting on a large U.S. bank's experiment comparing consumer credit
card choices with respect to no annual fee/higher interest rate versus annual fee/lower
interests rates when consumers do or do not carry balances).
96. Many commentators have been calling for more empirical studies exploring
consumer attitudes and behavior with respect to form contracts. See Robert A. Hill-
man, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-Standard Terms
Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837, 840-43 & n. 24 (2006) (also noting how most com-
mentators merely cite or quote Todd Rakoffs non-empirical piece, Rakoff, supra note
69, at 1179, for the proposition that consumers do not read standard form contracts).
97. Jill I. Gross & Barbara Black, When Perception Changes Reality: An Empiri-
cal Study of Investors' Views of the Fairness of Securities Arbitration, 2008 J. Disp.
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A. Behavioral Research
As noted above, some scholars have predicted that consumers are
unlikely to read and shop around for standard form contract terms. 98
In order to test this prediction, Professor Hillman surveyed 92 law
students regarding their contracting practices. 99 One may expect the
students surveyed to report contractual vigilance to their profes-
sor. 100 However, Professor Hillman found that beyond price and
product description, only 4% of the students reported that they read
their e-contracts for goods and services purchases "as a general mat-
ter," and 44% reported that they usually do not read terms beyond
price and product description. 1° 1 Seventeen percent reported that
they read some particular terms such as warranties, product infor-
mation, disclosures, and warnings for purchases. 10 2 Respondents' re-
ported reasons for failure to read e-contracts were being "in a hurry"
(65%), belief nothing will go wrong (42%), lack of diversity of others'
terms (42%), belief terms will be fair (32%), and belief law will cure
unfairness (26%).10 3 Only 7% indicated that they compare form
terms beyond price and product description despite the arguable ease
of "shopping around" via the Internet.104
Others have empirically studied the "rationality" of consumers'
credit practices. For example, Visa commissioned a survey of con-
sumers about their credit card behavior.' 0 5 The survey findings sug-
gested that consumers are not as economically "irrational" as
behavioral theorists have argued, to the extent that most consumers
RESOL. 349 (noting the limited research on arbitration and providing a report based
on the study of investors' perceptions).
98. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text (discussing work of Korobkin
and others who have highlighted the unlikelihood that individuals will negotiate form
contracts). See also Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 61, at 446-86.
99. Robert A. Hillman, On-line Consumer Standard Form Contracting Practices:
A Survey and Discussion of Legal Implications 25-30 (Cornell Law Sch. Research Pa-
per No. 05-012, 2005), available at http://ssrn.comabstract=686817.
100. Id. at 4-5 (acknowledging that the study was limited by the size and make-up
of the sample).
101. Hillman also found through cross-tabulation that 36 of the 40 non-readers
encompassed in the 44% would not read under any circumstances, while four of them
may read depending on term, type of vendor, or value of the item purchased. Surpris-
ingly, a larger percentage of the 92 respondents, 13%, reported that they do generally
read contracts for their e-subscriptions to such online services as those for database
searches, news, banking, dating, and phone. Id. at 7-9.
102. Id. at 8-12. Overall, roughly one-third stated that they would be more likely
to read e-contracts for higher value products or when the vendor is unknown. Id. at 8.
103. Id. at 9.
104. Id. at 12.
105. Tom Brown & Lacey Plache, Paying with Plastic: Maybe Not so Crazy, 73 U.
CHI. L. REv. 63, 63-77 (2006) (discussing the Payment System Panel Study ("PSPS")).
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do not pay annual fees on their credit cards and the majority of those
that do pay fees also carry revolving balances (presumably opting to
pay a fee to receive a lower interest rate).10 6 In addition, the findings
did not support behavioral theorists' claims that consumers irration-
ally fall prey to "teaser" rates and high-interest cards that offer re-
wards. 10 7 Other research similarly has indicated that the majority of
consumers generally choose economically beneficial credit cards for
their borrowing practices.108
In contrast, some studies have shown that consumers sign up for
credit cards based on "teaser" introductory rates, but "irrationally"
fail to switch to lower-rate credit cards when teaser rates expire.10 9
Research also has indicated that credit and banking markets have
not responded efficiently with respect to changing conditions - in-
stead, interest rates are "sticky." °10 Interest rates also have fallen
during periods of rising bankruptcy filings, although economic mod-
els of consumer credit expect banks to tighten lending and thus in-
crease rates during these times."' At the same time, evidence
suggests there is a high correlation between credit card debt and
bankruptcy filings.' 12
106. Id. at 77-83.
107. Id. at 81-83 & figures 2 & 3.
108. Agarwal et al., supra note 95 (studying consumers' selection between two
credit cards a U.S. bank offered to over 150,000 of its account holders). The study
examined holders' choices between one card with a higher interest rate and no annual
fee and the other with a fee but a lower rate. The researchers found that 60% selected
the economically optimal card for their borrowing practices, and that the avoidable
charges consumers bear due to their erroneous choices are fairly small (i.e., a roughly
$25 annual fee). The study also indicated that the likelihood of erroneous choice de-
creases as the magnitude of error costs increases, suggesting that consumers learn
from mistakes.
109. Haiyan Shui & Lawrence M. Ausubel, Time Inconsistency in the Credit Card
Market, 14TH ANNUAL UTAH WINTER FINANCE CONFERENCE (May 3, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=586622. See also David B. Gross & Nicholas S. Souleles, Do
Liquidity Constraints and Interest Rates Matter for Consumer Behavior? Evidence
from Credit Card Data, 117 Q.J. ECON. 149, 180 (2002) (finding that consumers leave
money in low-rate checking accounts although they fail to pay off credit cards at far
higher rates).
110. Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower:
Rationality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided "Reform" of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEx.
L. REV. 1481 (2006) (discussing such "sticky" interest rates and their interaction with
consumer behavior); Paul S. Calem & Loretta J. Mester, Consumer Behavior and the
Stickiness of Credit-Card Interest Rates, 85 AM. ECON. REv. 1327 (1995) (finding
sticky credit card interest rates during the 1980s and early 1990s).
111. Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 110, at 1501-08.
112. Id. at 1521-24. See also Ronald J. Mann, Credit Cards, Consumer Credit, and
Bankruptcy (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law Working Paper No. 44, 2006) (finding correla-
tion through regression analysis, but failing to account for endogeneity problems),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=690701.
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This sampling of behavioral research provides mixed and uncer-
tain evidence regarding consumers' propensity to read, negotiate, and
otherwise act in an economically rational manner with respect to
their contracts. 113 At the least, this evidence suggests that consumer
contracting is more complex than economic models predict. It also
raises questions regarding the efficacy of heightened disclosure regu-
lations, and whether they have a meaningful impact on consumers'
awareness and consideration of non-price terms such as arbitration
clauses - especially when consumers may already be prone to ignore
fee and interest terms, which are tantamount to price.
B. Contract Term Studies
Most of the other empirical studies of consumer contracts are
quantitative studies of gathered contract terms. For example, a
study of companies' appliance warranty terms in the early 1980s in-
dicated no significant relationship between the terms' restrictiveness
and the companies' market concentrations. 114 Similarly, a more re-
cent study of companies' End-User License Agreements ("EULAs") in
terms of their "pro-buyer" or "pro-seller" content with respect to 25
standard terms indicated that higher market share generally did not
lead to more pro-seller terms. 11 5 Overall, the author concluded that
competition impacts price and other "salient aspects of product qual-
ity but has weaker effect on less salient aspects, such as standard
terms."116
This same EULA study nonetheless suggested that there is a
possible correlation between market power and arbitration
113. See Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra note 12, at 1-23 (draft paper reporting
results from a new study of consumer contracting behavior both supporting and refut-
ing rational actor assumptions). Nonetheless, this research is limited by its sample's
small size, self-selection, and student demographic, and it does not test many salient
social and cognitive factors that may impact contracting. See id. The study is also
limited by its reliance on these students' reports of what they would do and not neces-
sarily what they have done with respect to contracts. Id. at 23.
114. George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J.
1297, 1319-25 (1981) (comparing gathered warranty terms with respect to how re-
strictive their provisions were on consumer rights and remedies, and correlating re-
strictiveness with the drafters' market shares). These findings contravened what one
may predict based on monopoly theory. Id.
115. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of Standard Form
Contracts: The Case of Software License Agreements, 5 J. EMPmICAL LEGAL STUD. 447
(2008) (creating seven categories of standard terms and using a system of adding/
subtracting points depending on her assessment of terms as more "pro-buyer" or "pro-
seller" than the applicable U.C.C. Article 2 default rules).
116. Id. at 451.
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clauses. 117 Seventy-five percent of the EULAs studied had choice of
law clauses, 28% had choice of forum clauses, and only 6% had arbi-
tration clauses. 118 In this small sample of EULAs with arbitration
clauses, most of the clauses also specified application of the drafters'
home state laws and administration by the AAA, 119 but they did not
appear to impose pro-seller regimes. 120 These findings are nonethe-
less limited to the extent the EULAs involve a narrow market. 121
Another study turned more broadly to consumer e-contracts of
Internet Retailer's 2005 top 500 companies, focusing on the assent
mechanisms these companies used for e-contracts. 122 The research-
ers reviewed the e-contracts and coded them according to an eight-
point continuum of assent level required, ranging from pure browse-
wrap, requiring no active indication of agreement, to robust click-
wrap, accompanied by electronic documents users must actively ac-
cept before completing registration or purchase. 123 They then corre-
lated assent levels with each company's market share and use of
"pro-seller" contract terms such as disclaimers, damage caps, and ar-
bitration clauses.124 They found that barely 10% of the dataset re-
quired consent beyond pure browse-wrap, and that arbitration
117. See generally id. at 473-75 (concluding that her results cast doubt on assump-
tions that competition conditions significantly impact standard terms, but noting a
correlation between higher prices and lower competition). Professor Marotta-Wurgler
discussed the EULA study first with respect to form contract terms generally and
later with respect to dispute resolution clauses. See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, "Un-
fair" Dispute Resolution Clauses: Much Ado About Nothing? (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ.
Research Paper No. 08-08, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1093293 (ex-
plaining focus of this new trajectory of her analysis of EULAs).
118. Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 117, at 10-16 (also finding that use of these dif-
ferent types of dispute resolution provisions was generally the same across business
and consumer sectors, and finding some evidence that larger and younger companies
were more likely to include choice of law clauses, possibly because larger companies
have more access to legal counsel in drafting their contracts).
119. Id. at 20-21 (noting that 25 of the 34 studied EULAs with arbitration clauses
selected the AAA, arguably recognizing the AAA's supplementary procedures for con-
sumer disputes).
120. Id. at 22.
121. See Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, "Volunteering" to Arbitrate
Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience, 67 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 64 (2004) (finding arbitration provisions in 35% of studied
consumer contracts).
122. Ronald J. Mann & Travis Siebeneicher, Just One Click: The Reality of In-
ternet Retail Contracting 1-3, 20-24 (Univ. of Tex. Law & Econ. Research Paper No.
104, 2007), available at http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/clbe/papers.
html.
123. Id. at 14-17.
124. Id. at 16-25 & n. 51 (also categorizing choice of law/forum, statute of limita-
tions, and jury/class action waivers as pro-seller, but essentially including these later
waivers with arbitration clauses).
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clauses appeared in less than a tenth of the contracts (44 of the 500
retailers). 125 They nonetheless found that companies used more ro-
bust mechanisms that required proactive consent with respect to pro-
seller terms, suggesting that companies may design their websites to
ensure the enforceability of these terms. 126
Although at least one study has shown fairly consistent use of
arbitration clauses,127 a more recent study indicated that companies
do not prefer arbitration over litigation in all their dealings. Re-
searchers looked at 26 consumer contracts and 164 non-consumer
contracts from 21 corporations in sectors including cellular phone,
cable, brokerage, and banking services and found that arbitration
clauses appeared in more than 75% of the companies' consumer con-
tracts but fewer than 10% of the negotiated business agreements. 12
They also found that all the consumer arbitration clauses included
class proceeding waivers, and 60% voided the arbitration provision if
class proceedings were ordered.' 29 The researchers concluded that
these findings suggest that companies do not view arbitration as su-
perior to litigation overall, but instead "value arbitration clauses for
their effects in suppressing aggregate proceedings by consumers, and
perhaps averting liability for widespread but low-value wrongs.' 30
Companies used arbitration clauses strategically to stymie consumer
access to remedies by preventing aggregate proceedings, which are
often consumers' only economically viable means for asserting small
claims.' 3 '
125. Id. at 20-23 (noting surprise at these findings about arbitration, especially in
light of other evidence that arbitration clauses are now standard in credit card
contracts).
126. Id. at 36-38 (adding that it is still surprising how many companies include
pro-seller terms in their contracts without enforceable assent interfaces).
127. See Eisenberg et al., Summer Soldiers, supra note 15, at 877-81 (describing
other research and reporting their pre-study hypothesis that companies who advocate
arbitration in their consumer contracts would similarly use arbitration in their other
contracts).
128. See Eisenberg et al., Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 15, at 118-23 (finding
arbitration clauses in 92.9% of employment contracts and 76.9% of consumer con-
tracts, but only 6.1% of non-consumer business contracts); Eisenberg et al., Summer
Soldiers, supra note 15 (examining arbitration clauses in contracts of companies in or
nearly in Fortune magazine's top 100 companies).
129. Class litigation waivers and non-severability provisions voiding arbitration if
class arbitration is awarded were significantly more prevalent in consumer than in
non-consumer business contracts. Eisenberg et al., Summer Soldiers, supra note 15,
at 884-86.
130. Eisenberg et al., Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 15, at 120-23.
131. Id. at 121-23 (also concluding that the "study suggests that the asserted bene-
fits of arbitration - fair outcomes arrived at faster and at lower cost - are not the
dominant motives for inclusion of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts in the
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Still, there is some evidence of companies' beneficial use of arbi-
tration clauses in their business-to-business dealings, especially in
international contexts. A study of international agreements among
businesses indicated higher use of provisions requiring arbitration or
other external dispute resolution procedures in complex contracts.1
32
This suggests that companies rationally use these clauses to temper
the costs and risks of litigation in accordance with Coasean economic
theory and to assist resolution of textured contract and cooperation
problems. 133 These companies are therefore more prone to invest re-
sources in arbitration and private dispute resolution provisions when
involved in complex exchanges.
These studies of contract terms provide some insight into compa-
nies' use of arbitration, but they are limited and inconclusive. The
EULA study targeted licenses, while the assent mechanism study in-
dicated companies fear unenforceability of their pro-seller terms such
as arbitration. Furthermore, the study most on point in assessing
frequency of arbitration clauses in companies' consumer versus other
contracts suggested that companies strategically use arbitration and
class action waivers to quell consumers' claims.
C. Arbitration Outcomes and Satisfaction
There have been limited studies of arbitration outcomes and of
disputants' perceptions of their satisfaction and experiences with ar-
bitral dispute resolution processes. The outcome studies generally
look at the "win" rates consumers or employees enjoy in arbitration,
defining "win" in various ways. Some also compare award amounts
parties obtain through arbitration versus litigation, but these studies
often fail to consider settlements or adjust for summary judgments
and dismissals. In addition, the satisfaction studies are arguably
clouded by hindsight biases because they usually focus only on par-
ticipants' perceptions of arbitration after their cases have been
resolved.
Outcome studies have provided mixed evidence that "weaker"
parties such as consumers and employees fare better in arbitration
industries we studied"). See also Eisenberg et al., Summer Soldiers, supra note 15, at
882-83, 894-95 (finding 90% of the employment contracts had arbitration clauses and
highlighting how companies would presumably include arbitration clauses in all their
contracts if they found it superior to litigation).
132. Koremenos, supra note 67, at 189-210 (gathering over 50,000 contracts regis-
tered with the United Nations and breaking this down to a random sample of 88
agreements for analysis).
133. Id. For further discussion of Coasean theory generally, see R.H. COASE, The
Nature of the Firm, in THE FiRm, THE MARKET, AND THE LAw 33 (1988).
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than litigation.134 One study indicated that employees won 73% of
AAA employment arbitrations in 1992, and employees won signifi-
cantly more cases in arbitration than litigation from 1993 to 1995.135
However, the AAA reported that in the 310 consumer arbitrations it
administered from January through August 2007, consumers pre-
vailed in 48% of the cases they filed as claimants, while businesses
prevailed in 74% of the cases they filed. 136 It also reported that 41%
of all arbitrated cases were resolved on the documents only and pro-
duced awards in approximately four months (versus six months for
in-person hearings). 137 Nonetheless, an AAA representative reported
that consumers enjoyed "favorable" outcomes overall in 81% of the
cases they filed in 2006 if one takes into account settlements and
monetary awards. 138
134. See generally Eisenberg et al., Summer Soldiers, supra note 15, at 871-74 &
nn. 6-8.
135. See Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil
Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 29, 45-50 (1998) (discussing studies of employ-
ment arbitration outcomes).
136. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Analysis of the American Arbitration Association's
Consumer Arbitration Caseload, http://www.adr.orglsi.asp?id=5027 (last visited Feb.
6, 2010) (noting that although the AAA administers roughly 1,500 consumer cases
each year, it limited its analysis to the 310 arbitrated cases that resulted in awards).
137. Id. The AAA also states that it applies its SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES FOR
CONSUMER-RELATED DISPUTES when it administers what qualify as "consumer" cases,
defined as those "between individual consumers and businesses where the business
has a standardized, systematic application of arbitration clauses with customers and
where the terms and conditions of the purchase of standardized, consumable goods or
services" are primarily "non-negotiable." Id. This excludes residential construction
cases, which accounted for 937 cases in 2005 and 1,119 in 2006. E-mail from Jennifer
Jester Coffman, Senior Vice President of the Am. Arbitration Ass'n, to Amy J.
Schmitz, Assoc. Professor, Univ. of Colo. Law Sch. (June 6, 2007) (on file with author).
138. See E-mail from Wayne Kessler, Vice President, Corporate Communications,
Am. Arbitration Ass'n, to Amy J. Schmitz, Assoc. Professor, Univ. of Colo. Law Sch.
(Jan. 14, 2008) (on file with author). The AAA had previously indicated that it admin-
istered 1,294 consumer arbitration cases in 2006. See E-mail from Jennifer Jester
Coffman, Senior Vice President of the Am. Arbitration Ass'n, to Amy J. Schmitz, As-
soc. Professor, Univ. of Colo. Law Sch. (June 6, 2007) (on file with author). The AAA
also indicated that in 2005 it received 1,652 consumer disputes including claims re-
lated to banking, lending, credit cards, mortgages, education, home construction,
wireless phones, real estate, car sales, warranties, accounting, and financial advice.
See E-mail from Jennifer Jester Coffman, Senior Vice President of the Am. Arbitra-
tion Ass'n, to Amy J. Schmitz, Assoc. Professor, Univ. of Colo. Law Sch. (Mar. 16,
2007) (on file with author). Sixty-eight percent of these disputes involved claims of
less than $75,000. Id.; see also Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Consumer Arbitration Statis-
tics, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=29470 (last visited Jan. 27, 2010); ERNST & YOUNG
LLP, OUTCOMES OF ARBITRATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CONSUMER LENDING CASES
(2004), available at http://www.adrforum.com/rcontrol/documents/ResearchStudies
AndStatistics/2005ErstAndYoung.pdf (reporting that in the lending-related NAF
consumer arbitrations Ernst & Young studied in the early 2000s, 55% were resolved
in the consumer's favor and a majority of the consumers surveyed were satisfied with
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Some researchers have focused on securities arbitration due, in
part, to its impact on consumer investors who generally have no
choice but to have their securities claims resolved by NASD or NYSE
pursuant to industry forms and norms. 139 Fairness concerns have
fueled this attention in light of findings indicating a steady decline in
investor-claimant win rates in securities arbitrations from 1999 to
2004, and overall "win" recoveries of roughly 50% of amounts
claimed.140 For example, researchers studied securities arbitrators'
awards in light of their backgrounds and political ideologies. They
found that arbitrators who also represent brokers award less com-
pensation to investor-claimants than other arbitrators. 14'
Nonetheless, a study of survey responses from 3,087 participants
in securities arbitrations regarding their satisfaction with the process
indicated that customer respondents generally had positive views of
the arbitrators' competence and attentiveness. 14 2 However, custom-
ers reported less satisfaction with outcomes, arbitrators' impartiality,
the arbitration process); CALIFORNIA DISPUTE RESOLUTION INST., CONSUMER AND EM-
PLOYMENT ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA: A REVIEW OF WEBSITE DATA POSTED PURSUANT
TO SECTION 1281.96 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (2004), available at http://www.
mediate.com/cdricdri-printAug_6.pdf (providing findings regarding use of arbitra-
tion and outcomes).
139. Stephen J. Choi et al., Attorneys as Arbitrators (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Re-
search Paper No. 08-18; Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 09-001,
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1086372 (survey of 422 randomly selected
arbitrators and their 6,724 awards from mostly NASD securities proceedings from
1992 to 2006).
140. Id. at 12 (discussing a prior study by Edward S. O'Neil and Donald R. Solin
done without NASD support). Note that this arbitration is quasi-public to the extent
it is subject to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) oversight. Id.
141. Id. at 15-16, 21-23, 36-37 (noting that this supported their arguments that
the 1998 securities arbitration reforms have advantaged repeat-players and that the
2004 reforms did little to counteract conflict of interest concerns). The study also
linked arbitrators' political leanings with their awards. Id. at 21-37. This is not
unique to arbitrators. See Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman,
Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA.
L. REV. 301 (2004) (finding Democratic or Republican political leanings do have some
impact on judges' decisions, especially in affirmative action, sexual discrimination/
harassment, Title VII, and certain business cases).
142. Jill I. Gross & Barbara Black, When Perception Changes Reality: An Empiri-
cal Study of Investors' Views of the Fairness of Securities Arbitration 7-9, 35-37 (Univ.
of Cincinnati Coll. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No.
09-12, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1118430 [hereinafter Gross &
Black #1118430] (noting academic support for the importance of perceptions in ex-
plaining why their study asked participants about their perceptions about arbitrators'
competence, impartiality, and awards); Jill I. Gross & Barbara Black, Perceptions of
Fairness of Securities Arbitration: An Empirical Study (Univ. of Cincinnati Coll. of
Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 08-01, 2008), availa-
ble at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1090969 [hereinafter Gross & Black #1090969] (as-
sessing participants' perceptions of the fairness of securities arbitration, competence
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and the overall fairness of the arbitration process. 143 Over 75% of
customer respondents answered "very unfair" or "somewhat unfair"
when asked "[how fair is securities arbitration as compared to
court," and only 35.6% of these respondents said they would choose
arbitration over litigation in the future.144 In addition, customers re-
ported that they lacked knowledge about the securities arbitration
process, presence of "industry arbitrators" on the panels, and gener-
ally how the arbitrators perform or make decisions.145 The research-
ers concluded that these findings overall indicated that the customers
do not view arbitration as fair and economical for all parties in-
volved. 146 These perceptions are nonetheless tempered by evidence
that investors generally fare better in arbitration than in
litigation. 147
Another survey focused on pre- and post-process perceptions and
satisfaction with respect to dispute resolution; it highlighted the need
for dispute resolution education. 148 The survey findings indicated
that the disputants' initial perceptions of dispute resolution processes
did not impact what processes they ultimately used. The researchers
surmised that this was likely due to parties' reliance on their lawyers
of securities arbitrators, and fairness of arbitration outcomes - all in comparison to
litigation).
143. Gross & Black #1090969, supra note 142, at 37-39, 41-45 (discussing the find-
ings based on Likert scale questions). Sixty-three percent of the customers they sur-
veyed disagreed with the statement that "as a whole, I feel the arbitration process
was fair." Id. at 45.
144. Id. at 46-48.
145. Gross & Black #1118430, supra note 97, at 40-41 (noting the percentages of
customers who reported they "did not know" to many questions about the arbitration
processes in which they participated).
146. Gross & Black #1090969, supra note 142, at 52-53. This led Gross and Black
to conclude that it is critical for policymakers to design securities reforms aimed at
tempering perceived bias of industry arbitrators and lack of transparency in securi-
ties arbitration processes. Id. at 51-59.
147. Jill I. Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty: The Regulation of Fairness in Securi-
ties Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 493, 496-99, 517-20 (2008) (addressing the propri-
ety of the Supreme Court's endorsement of securities arbitration in McMahon
premised on assumed SEC fairness regulation, and explaining why securities arbitra-
tion is the better alternative for investors).
148. Donna Shestowsky & Jeanne M. Brett, Disputants' Perceptions of Dispute
Resolution Procedures: A Longitudinal Empirical Study 1-5, 21-26 (Univ. of Cal., Da-
vis, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 130, 2008), available at http://ssrn.coml
abstract=1103585 (discussing a longitudinal field study involving 108 completed pa-
per surveys of disputants with cases filed in late 2004 and early 2005, followed by
telephone surveys with 44 of these disputants concerning their cases; of these, 26
were settled, negotiated, dismissed, or dropped, nine went to trial, one went to media-
tion, and one went to arbitration).
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and lack of necessary knowledge or experience regarding dispute res-
olution processes to make their own informed assessments. 149
Overall, the available research about process satisfaction indi-
cates a lack of consumer information and understanding about arbi-
tration. Although the research is mixed, there is evidence that
companies do not necessarily use market power to impose onerous
arbitration clauses, and consumers often fare well in arbitration.
Nonetheless, other evidence indicates that some companies do use ar-
bitration to consumers' disadvantage, and consumers generally have
negative perceptions and voice dissatisfaction with arbitration. Al-
though some consumer negativity may be unwarranted, there is need
to rein in abusive practices and provide consumers with effective dis-
closures and better information about arbitration processes.
IV. MULTI-PRONGED ARBITRATION CONTRACT RESEARCH
Contract term and arbitration satisfaction or outcome studies
have left research gaps regarding consumers' contracting behavior
and understanding of arbitration clauses. Some scholars have high-
lighted these gaps, inviting further qualitative study in the form of
interviews and surveys to provide a more complete understanding of
arbitration clauses. 150 My mixed-method research provides this type
of data. Accordingly, I will give a synopsis of my findings from gath-
ering arbitration terms in consumer wireless phone service and credit
card contracts. I will then add findings regarding consumers' percep-
tions and understandings of arbitration clauses from the consumer
focus groups I held in Denver and my recent electronic survey of Colo-
rado consumers.
A. Gathered Arbitration Clauses
As noted above, other studies have shed light on companies' use
of arbitration clauses in EULAs, international contracts, and con-
sumer versus commercial contracts.1 5' My study focused on collec-
tion and analysis of arbitration clauses in wireless phone service and
149. Id. at 30-42 (concluding that courts could improve disputants' ex post satis-
faction by subsidizing the neutral's fees for court-mandated ADR and giving dispu-
tants the option of pursuing trial).
150. See Mann & Siebeneicher, supra note 122, at 40 (noting this with respect to
their findings suggesting a close relation between industry concentration and arbitra-
tion clauses). My study attempts to provide more of the qualitative picture of consum-
ers' contracting with respect to arbitration clauses.
151. See supra Part III (discussing prior research).
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credit card contracts. Although this was fairly unscientific and in-
volved small samples, the work adds to the research landscape by
focusing on common consumer contracts in industries that have been
targeted for corporate use of arbitration to curb consumers' access to
class action and statutory remedies. This research also builds on
findings that industry concentration may be closely related to use of
arbitration clauses. 152
1. Consumer Credit Card Contracts
My collection and analysis of arbitration clauses began with
credit card companies' form contracts due to reports that companies
use these clauses to consumers' disadvantage. 153 Such reports con-
tributed to a law barring arbitration requirements in active duty mil-
itary members' consumer credit contracts and have generated
support for legislative initiatives to bar arbitration clauses in con-
sumer contracts more generally.' 54 Furthermore, credit card compa-
nies have been the target of growing numbers of consumer challenges
of arbitration clauses, including antitrust claims that banks have ille-
gally colluded to force consumers to accept arbitration clauses.1 55
152. See Mann & Siebeneicher, supra note 122, at 40 (noting correlation); Eisen-
berg et al., Summer Soldiers, supra note 15, at 882-85, 890-92 (highlighting compa-
nies' disparate use of arbitration clauses in consumer versus non-consumer
contracts).
153. See Alan S. Kaplinsky, The Use of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements by
Consumer Financial Services Providers, 1591 PLJICoRP. 35, 49 (2007) (including Ci-
tibank, Chase, AMEX, Discover, Bank of America, Capital One, Washington Mutual,
MBNA, and GE Capital in list of arbitration users); PUBLIC CITIZEN'S CONGRESS
WATCH, THE ARBITRATION TRAP: How CREDIT CARD COMPANIES ENSNARE CONSUMERS
(2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/publications/print-release.cfm?ID=7545
(summarizing results of the consumer advocacy group's examination of the credit card
industry's use of arbitration); see also id. at 1 (concluding that "binding mandatory
arbitration is a rigged game in which justice is dealt from a deck stacked against
consumers"); Collected Wireless Phone and Credit Card Arbitration Provisions (chart
on file with author) (last updated Mar. 2008) [hereinafter Collected Arbitration Provi-
sions] (finding such prevalent use).
154. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-
364, § 670(a), 120 Stat. 2083 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 987 (2006)) (making arbitration
clauses unlawful in consumer credit contracts with military service members); Arbi-
tration Fairness Act ("AFA") of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposed, but
not passed, bill barring enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer,
employment, and franchise contexts); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782 &
H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007) (identical bill that has continually been proposed for
barring arbitration clauses in consumer, employment, and franchise contracts).
155. Westlaw Search Results for "arbitration w/20 "credit card" & da(aft 1/1/2007)"
in ALLCASES database retrieved 208 cases on March 10, 2009 (on file with author).
The same search on June 6, 2008, retrieved 136 cases, indicating that the cases keep
piling up (on file with author). See also Ross v. Bank of America, N.A., 524 F.3d 217,
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As an initial matter, it was notably difficult to obtain copies of
consumer credit contracts in order to analyze their inclusion of arbi-
tration clauses. My research indicated that credit card companies
usually provide only basic interest rate and "special offer" or "bonus"
information on their websites and mailed offers. They rarely include
or make available their full form contract terms. Furthermore, they
generally will only allow a consumer to obtain a copy of the contract
after the consumer has become a customer, or at least has applied for
a card.156 Nine of the largest credit card companies refused phone
requests for copies of their form credit card contracts prior to submit-
ting a credit application, and none of the twenty companies I wrote to
with requests for advance copies of their contracts have sent the
copies.157
In the end, thirteen credit card contracts were gathered and up-
dated through requests from companies and independent research. 158
These were then charted in terms of existence and content of their
arbitration provisions, as well as information the contracts provided
223-26 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that consumers allege sufficient injury in fact to pro-
ceed with their antitrust claims against credit card companies for colluding in the use
of arbitration clauses).
156. Collected Arbitration Provisions, supra note 153. The collection and updating
since June 2007 has been difficult and inexact due to companies' refusals to provide
copies of their contracts beyond general rate and fee information. I gathered some of
the contracts using copies obtained from my own credit cards or from students and
friends, but most of the companies we contacted to obtain their terms have not pro-
vided copies despite phone calls, e-mails, and letters. See, e.g., Letters to Credit Card
Companies and Research Assistant Chronicles [hereinafter Letters], Letters from
Amy J. Schmitz, Assoc. Professor, Univ. of Colo. Law Sch. (Feb. 6, 2008) (showing
attempts to obtain contracts) (record of letters and research assistant log of calls to
credit card companies on file with author).
157. Letters, supra note 156. For example, a research assistant reported that he
called Chase to obtain a copy of their terms and conditions but the phone representa-
tive refused to send him a copy until he became a card holder, even after he explained
that he did not want to apply for a card until after he knew the terms. See E-mail
from Aaron Clippinger, Research Assistant, to Amy J. Schmitz, Assoc. Professor,
Univ. of Colo. Law Sch. (May 31, 2008) (Chase representative nonetheless suggested
that the terms might be available to someone who has been pre-approved for a credit
card).
158. See id. For example, U.S. Bank and Chase AARP Visa representatives in-
formed my research assistant that she could not obtain a Cardmember Agreement
until she applied and received a credit card from the respective companies. See Notes
from Dana Jozefczyk to Amy J. Schmitz, Boulder, Colo. (Feb. 2008) (chart on file with
author); see also Eisenberg et al., Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 15, at 120 n.8
(noting how credit card companies will not provide their full consumer agreements
until after one has submitted personal information and been approved for a card and
describing a company representative's refusal to provide an advance copy of the com-
pany's contract on grounds it "did not furnish its contracts to 'just anyone'").
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regarding APRs and other fees. Of these thirteen credit card con-
tracts, three did not include pre-dispute arbitration clauses and one
allowed the consumer to opt out of the arbitration clause within
thirty days of receiving the terms by sending written notice to the
company. 15 9 Two of the companies' credit applications provided a
brief statement that they required consumers to submit any disputes
to binding arbitration under terms contained in the complete Cus-
tomer Agreement, which consumers may obtain only after becoming
credit card customers. 160
The seven contracts with full arbitration provisions varied in
length, specificity, and content regarding procedures and reme-
dies.' 6 ' Four of the provisions complied with the Consumer Due Pro-
cess Protocol noted above to the extent that they allowed consumers
to bring qualifying cases to small claims court, and five specified that
the arbitration take place in the consumers' home location.' 62 Six
provided for some degree of company advancement or payment of ar-
bitration filing fees.163 Examples included payment for all costs,
those over $2,500, or those over what the consumer would have paid
had the claims been filed in court.' 64 Nonetheless, all of the con-
tracts' arbitration provisions expressly precluded class action or con-
solidated proceedings of any kind, in court or in arbitration. 65 This
confirms prior research indicating companies' use of arbitration
clauses in consumer contracts to bar class relief and limit consumer
claims.166
159. Collected Arbitration Provisions, supra note 153.
160. Id. These contracts also stated that all terms may be changed at any time.
161. Collected Arbitration Provisions, supra note 153. Some arbitration provi-
sions were very difficult to read in terms of length and small typeface, even for a law
professor.
162. Id.
163. Id. Some of these contracts nonetheless allowed for any fee advanced by the
company to be reallocated for payment by the consumer in the award. One contract
also specified that the consumer would pay for fees required in conjunction with any
consumer-requested appeal to a three-arbitrator panel. Id.
164. Id. In between the extremes, one provided that the company would pay any
costs over what the consumer would pay to file in court and the other required the
company to pay filing fees over $500 plus administrative and arbitrator fees for two
days of hearings. Id.
165. Id. Some of the contracts also specified that the arbitration provision be-
comes void if class arbitration is ordered despite the contracts' preclusion of such class
relief. Id.
166. It seems companies began expressly precluding class arbitration in the wake
of arbitration providers' allowance for such proceedings. Collected Arbitration Provi-
sions, supra note 153. See also supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text (discussing
Professor Eisenberg et al.'s research comparing companies' use of consumer versus
non-consumer contracts).
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In addition, although the small sample size did not allow for
meaningful statistical analysis, the credit card contracts studied did
not indicate that the companies using arbitration clauses passed on
savings from these clauses through lower rates and fees. Instead, the
credit unions generally had the lowest rates regardless of whether
they required arbitration. In addition, the three credit card agree-
ments with the highest interest rates at the time the clauses were
studied all were careful to preclude class action relief.167 It was tell-
ing on a broader level to see the often surprising additional fees the
companies charge for everything from copies to making payments by
telephone. 16s Although these rates and fees very well may relate to
other risk, cost, and market issues, they at least call into question
economists' arguments that companies pass on arbitration-related
cost savings to their customers.1 69
2. Wireless Phone Companies' Consumer Contracts
In tandem with the above research, I gathered wireless phone
service contracts from the nine major providers with a presence in
Colorado. All of the companies required arbitration of consumer
claims. They did this as a blanket mandate or by giving either party
the right to require arbitration of any dispute that arises. Again, this
was a limited sample. However, their blanket use of arbitration
clauses supports procedural unconscionability claims that consumers
generally have no true choice when it comes to arbitration of wireless
service claims.
The wireless service companies studied did not appear to impose
more onerous arbitration provisions on consumers in exchange for
better rates, features, coverage, support, and phone selection. Al-
though the small sample was not statistically analyzed, the wireless
service rankings done by Consumer Reports and other independent
organizations gave top ratings to two of the companies with the most
Protocol-compliant arbitration clauses among those studied to the ex-
tent that they required the companies to pay all or most filing fees
and allowed consumers to use small claims court remedies. 70
167. Collected Arbitration Provisions, supra note 153.
168. Id. (e.g., one company charges $25 for a dishonored check, $6 for copies, and
$15 for a phone payment).
169. Compare Ware, supra note 72, at 254-64, 292 (proposing benefits of arbitra-
tion clauses) with Collected Arbitration Provisions, supra note 153.
170. See Collected Arbitration Provisions, supra note 153; TopTenREVIEWS, Inc.,
2010 Cell Phone Providers Review Comparisons, http://cell-phone-providers-review.
toptenreviews.com (last visited Feb. 12, 2010) (placing Verizon and AT&T at the top
per cost, plan, features, coverage, phone selection, and support).
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In addition, regardless of company rankings, all nine of the com-
panies' contracts reviewed included explicit waivers of class or consol-
idated proceedings in either court or arbitration.' 7 1 Five of the
contracts went further to expressly void the arbitration requirements
if class proceedings were ordered. 172 This confirmed others' research
finding the prevalence in consumer contracts of class action waivers
and non-severability provisions voiding arbitration clauses if class ar-
bitration is ordered.173 It also raised concerns regarding companies'
strategic use of these clauses to effectively avoid liability for large-
scale but small-dollar consumer claims, even if that means choosing
litigation over arbitration out of fear that arbitrators will order class
arbitration using their discretion or provider rules. 174 Although com-
panies aim to avoid class actions in any venue, it seems they prefer to
at least have judicial constraints on any class proceedings they can-
not avoid.
The arbitration provisions reviewed also exemplified how
merchants slide questionable provisions into arbitration clauses that
may not pass judicial muster if outside of the FAA's pro-enforcement
glaze.' 75 All of the class waivers appeared in generally lengthy arbi-
tration or dispute resolution clauses. Furthermore, most of the
clauses contained confusing terms that could negatively impact con-
sumers' claims. For example, one of the lengthy arbitration require-
ments precluded claims after two years from when they arose and
further stated:
171. Collected Arbitration Provisions, supra note 153.
172. One typical contract accessible on the Internet stated among its lengthy
terms in white typeface on a black background, "(6) We each agree not to pursue arbi-
tration on a classwide basis. We each agree that any arbitration will be solely be-
tween you and us (not brought on behalf of or together with another individual's
claim). If for any reason any court or arbitrator holds that this restriction is uncon-
scionable or unenforceable, then our agreement to arbitrate doesn't apply and the
dispute must be brought in court." In addition, the contract included another clause
in all capital letters precluding class relief of any kind in court or arbitration under
any circumstances. Boostmobile, Terms and Conditions of Service, http'//support.
boostmobile.com/servicepolicies/terms.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2010).
173. See supra notes 127-33 and accompanying text (discussing research finding
use of class waivers in consumer, but not other commercial, contracts of top
companies).
174. See, e.g., Am. Arbitration Ass'n, AAA Policy on Class Arbitrations (July 14,
2005), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=25967 (last visited Feb. 27, 2010); AM. ARBITRA-
TION Ass'N, SUPPLEMENTAL RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS (effective Oct. 8, 2003),
available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?ID=21936 (allowing for class arbitration pro-
ceedings if an agreement allows class arbitrations or is silent on the issue).
175. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text (discussing research finding
use of arbitration clauses to bolster enforcement of otherwise questionable limitations
on consumers' access to remedies).
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Notwithstanding the foregoing [the company] has the right to
institute legal or equitable proceedings in any court of compe-
tent jurisdiction for claims or disputes regarding: (i) amounts
owed by you in connection with your purchase of Service, or (ii)
your violation of the provisions of this Agreement. 176
This not only preserves the companies' access to court, but also ap-
pears to free the company from the two-year time limitation imposed
on consumers.
177
Overall, most of the arbitration terms reviewed in the credit card
and wireless service contracts were buried in long form contracts, and
often appeared in unnoticeable or small typeface.1 7 8 The terms also
were slipped in "bill stuffers" or included in e-contracts accessible
only through website links or "pop-ups" that consumers could easily
bypass or overlook.' 79 However, a few of the arbitration clauses were
in bold or all capital letters and directed consumers to arbitration
providers' websites for further information regarding administration
of any proceedings. 8 0
3. Lessons Learned
This limited review of contract terms is not particularly scientific
and is by no means exhaustive. Nonetheless, it adds to the research
picture with respect to consumer markets in which companies gener-
ally have great power and consumers have little choice but to accept
176. MetroPCS, Terms and Conditions of Service, http://www.metropcs.com/
privacy/terms.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2010).
177. Of course, a court may interpret this differently or sever it from the arbitra-
tion clause using a contract defense. Nonetheless, this provision seems particularly
onerous due to the breadth of the concluding carve out.
178. For example, the Boost Mobile arbitration provisions referenced above, acces-
sible on the company's website, filled two pages toward the end of the Terms and
Conditions in white typeface on a black background and specified that consumers ac-
cept these terms and conditions simply by accessing the web site. See Boostmobile,
Terms and Conditions of Service, supra note 172.
179. This coincides with others' research of companies' consumer e-contracting
practices. See Mann & Siebeneicher, supra note 122, at 20-24 (finding fewer than
10% of the 500 Internet retailers' e-contracts studied required assent to e-contract
terms beyond pure browse-wrap).
180. See Alltel Wireless, Terms and Conditions, http://tinyurl.com/yjpkyy2 (last
visited February 21, 2010) (relatively simple clause under "ARBITRATION"). The
clause required the company to pay administrative costs exceeding those the con-
sumer would pay in court. Still, the brief clause precluded class relief, required the
parties to bear their own costs of preparing their cases, and denied the arbitrator any
authority to modify any of the contract's terms, including the term's limitation of lia-
bility section. Id.
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contract terms as presented. 1' My review mostly confirmed claims
that companies use arbitration clauses to limit their vulnerability to
consumer claims, especially class actions.
The difficulty of obtaining credit card contracts and the overall
presentation of the contracts obtained contradicted research noted
above indicating companies' use of more robust assent mechanisms
with respect to arbitration clauses in their e-contracts.1' 2 Instead,
my research indicated that at least in the wireless service and credit
card contexts, powerful companies dictate consumer form terms,
knowing consumers generally cannot "shop around" for optimal con-
tracts. This is especially true when consumers lack opportunity to
review, let alone negotiate, advance copies of companies' contracts. 183
Furthermore, consumers' eyes are likely to glaze over attempting to
read and decipher companies' terms even when consumers get the
opportunity to review advance copies.' 8 4
Nonetheless, not all companies require arbitration, and some
companies offer more consumer-friendly provisions to the extent they
comply with the Consumer Due Process Protocol. A few of the con-
tracts reviewed prescribed use of arbitration providers' consumer
rules, company payment of some level of arbitration costs, and con-
sumer retention of small claims court access. The research therefore
highlighted the following consumer concerns: lack of notice and in-
formation about the arbitration process, lack of public information
and access to discovery, and lack of class relief to make small claims
feasible and ensure enforcement of statutory rights. Although regu-
lations may be warranted in all these areas, this article focuses only
on regulatory design to address notice and disclosure concerns.
181. Indeed, consumers recently launched antitrust claims against the major
credit card companies for collusive use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses to quell con-
sumers' access to remedies. Ross, 524 F.3d at 223-26 (consumers pursuing antitrust
claims against banks for colluding to impose arbitration clauses that harm
consumers).
182. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing research findings of
Mann and Siebeneicher).
183. This contradicts courts' rejections of procedural unconscionability claims
based on assumptions that consumers can shop for contract terms. See supra notes
57-60 and accompanying text (discussing cases enforcing class action waivers).
184. See Becher, supra note 71, at 161-78 (discussing how information overload
hinders consumers' comprehension of contract terms). Even ostensibly conspicuous
wording in all capital letters may dissuade reading. See MARY BETH BEAZLEY, A
PRACTIcAL GUIDE TO APPELLATE ADVOCACY 172 (2d ed. 2006) (noting how "headings
made up of all capital letters are extremely difficult to read").
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B. Focus Group Research
Traditional legal research, especially in the area of contracts,
tends to disregard qualitative interview or focus group methods.
Qualitative and focus group research nonetheless sheds light on real-
ities of law in action and reveals questions ripe for further explora-
tion.18 5 Understandings and perceptions matter because they shape
individuals' realities and their trust in the market.18 6 Negative per-
ceptions of arbitration impact efficiency by breeding costly challenges
of arbitration agreements and awards, even in cases where they may
not be warranted.187 My focus group research therefore adds qualita-
tive and organic insight into consumer perceptions and seeks to pro-
vide an "in action" or "on the street" peek into consumers' views of
contracting and arbitration.
Consumers were randomly recruited to participate in focus group
discussions on contracting issues that were held in Denver over two
days in November 2006.188 Despite recruitment in print and online,
there were only three small group sessions comprised of mainly Cau-
casian women. Nonetheless, some men and non-Caucasians also
joined the discussions, and the participants as a whole were "typical"
in that they had very little arbitration experience. In addition, no
formal surveys were conducted, which helped foster comfortable
discussions.
Overall, these consumers reported that they felt demoralized and
helpless against companies' form contracts and arbitration
clauses.18 9 They were pessimistic about companies' contracting prac-
tices and arbitration programs, and they generally distrusted
merchant sellers of goods and services. 190 Many reported instances
when they were stuck with extra charges or unpleasantly surprised
185. See Stewart Macaulay, A New Legal Realism: Elegant Models and the Messy
Law in Action, Presentation at University of Colorado Law School (Apr. 18, 2008) (on
file with author).
186. See id. at 6-7 (also discussing and citing work of Professors William Thomas
and Dorothy Thomas acknowledging this longstanding truism).
187. See Gross & Black #1118430, supra note 97, at 7-9 (highlighting why subjec-
tive perceptions of arbitration matter regardless of whether they reflect factual
reality).
188. See Amy J. Schmitz, Notes, Consumer Focus Group, in Denver, Colo. (Nov.
18, 2006) (unpublished notes, on file with author). Schmitz recruited consumers by
offering $25 to participate in the discussions and placing announcements in newspa-
pers and on Craigslist and other such online sources. The research was done with the
approval of the University of Colorado Human Research Council (HRC) after comple-
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with consequences of form contract terms they believed companies
imposed through indecipherable fine print or post-contract
changes. 191
Consumers in the discussions also reported that they regularly
throw out "bill stuffers" with terms companies add to consumer con-
tracts, and they often bypass "terms and conditions" links in e-con-
tracts they enter into over the Internet. 192 One consumer explained,
"I'm just scroll, scroll, scroll, accept."1 93 Consumers said they feel it
is a waste of time to read or retain any copies of form contracts be-
cause they have no choice but to accept them.194 One consumer re-
counted her "nerve-wracking" trip to the dentist in which she
unsuccessfully tried to contest terms given to her right before her
dental procedure, leaving her to simply hope that the dentist was
competent. 195
Some of the consumers nonetheless reported a sense of freedom
from their ability to "shop around" even if they cannot effectuate
changes in companies' form contracts. One consumer explained her
belief that "the nice thing about competition is that if you don't like
the contract you can just move on."1 96 However, she also believed
that competition did not give her leverage to negotiate changes in
form contracts "just because they're done like in a corporate setting
and they trickle down to the actual retail stores."' 97
Consumers indicated that they have little to no understanding
regarding arbitration. They generally said that they merely assumed
arbitration clauses must be something companies slip into their con-
tracts to consumers' disadvantage.198 When asked about noticing ar-
bitration clauses, one consumer relayed her feeling that such clauses
are likely in the "same stuff' she "usually just scan[s] through" but
"know[s] she should probably read."199 Another consumer had no-
ticed arbitration clauses in form contracts and assumed that arbitra-
tion was "supposed to be unbiased" but really the arbitrator would be
191. See Amy J. Schmitz, Transcripts, Consumer Focus Group, in Denver, Colo.
(Nov. 17-18, 2006) (unpublished transcripts, on file with author). For example, one
consumer told a story about a magazine she unknowingly became liable for when
signing up for a credit card years earlier.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. See also Schmitz, Notes, supra note 188.
195. Schmitz, Transcripts, supra note 191 (further explaining that her uncle had
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"on [the company's] side" and "act like they are listening and say the
compan[y is] right and move on down the road."20 0 Fellow group par-
ticipants echoed beliefs that companies use such terms to "cover their
own butts."20 1
These negative perceptions of arbitration also impacted consum-
ers' reported preferences for court versus arbitration. When asked,
"What do you think about going to arbitration versus going to court?"
one consumer responded: "I think I'd prefer court, I know that seems
weird but, because to me I would feel like I have a better chance."20 2
The consumer explained: "It goes back to the thing where I don't nec-
essarily think that the arbitrator would be unbiased. Even though
they may say it, I don't know, I'm just not a very trusting person
sometimes <chuckles>." 20 3 The consumer nonetheless said she might
prefer arbitration if administered by the Better Business Bureau be-
cause "they are, not necessarily on my side, but at least 50% on my
side."20 4
Another consumer who taught in an inner-city school opined that
students like hers who feel they can only settle disputes through vio-
lence evidence "the less powerful people in society and they don't wait
around for an arbitrator."20 5 The consumer explained that even with
contract or purchase disputes, consumers feel: "Hey, I ain't gonna
win no matter what. It's just a matter of luck if I can get through this
transaction and not get screwed."20 6 She concluded that this feeling
was typical since most consumers are "at middle and below."20 7
At the same time, consumers in the focus groups indicated that
they often prefer to discuss complaints and claims in person with a
manager or other company representative, rather than through let-
ters or e-mails. They felt they would get a more satisfying resolution
through personal dealings. 20 8 However, consumers also reported
great difficulties even contacting company representatives by tele-
phone or e-mail to negotiate terms or resolve complaints. 20 9 This was
especially true when purchasing goods or services via the Internet.2 10
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. (first asking if the arbitration clause precludes litigation and seeming up-
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They also recounted instances in which salespersons told them that
form terms were not subject to any alteration, or that the salesper-
sons lacked power to change company terms. 211
Again, this was fairly limited focus group research. The discus-
sions nonetheless helped paint the consumer contracting picture with
respect to arbitration clauses and indicated a common lack of under-
standing regarding arbitration. The discussions also supported evi-
dence of consumers' negative perceptions of form contracts and
companies' use of arbitration clauses, and indicated that consumers
expect arbitration to be biased even if they are unsure what it entails.
The research again highlights a need for consumer notice and
education regarding arbitration clauses. 212 It also raises questions
regarding companies' lack of connection with or accountability to con-
sumers, which escalates the likelihood of conflict and the inefficien-
cies it breeds. This casts doubts on efficiency theorists' contentions
that consumers will use their power to regulate corporate conduct,
especially when consumers lack power to reach company representa-
tives or are so disillusioned that they no longer try. Disillusionment
coupled with contracting inertia also stymies consumers' impetus to
rectify their past contracting mistakes. 213 Disclosure and education
regarding arbitration may help address these problems by empower-
ing consumers to avoid or negotiate arbitration clauses, or to employ
them to their advantage to obtain remedies.
C. Online Survey Background and Findings
The above research provided initial insights into consumer con-
tracting, especially with respect to arbitration clauses. However, it
lacked the scope and depth that survey research can provide. I there-
fore developed a survey for administration over the Internet that was
unique from other surveys in that it did not focus on simply purchas-
ing practices or preferences, or satisfaction with arbitration proceed-
ings. It went beyond these questions to explore what I call
"contracting culture."21 4 The online or "e" survey explored attention,
211. Id. See also Schmitz, Notes, supra note 188.
212. Consumers' assumptions of arbitrator bias also seem to confirm repeat-player
bias, at least to the extent that it has become a reality to consumers regardless of
whether they have actual experience with arbitration or even understand what it en-
tails. See supra notes 139-47 and accompanying text (discussing repeat-player con-
cerns and research regarding investors' perceptions of biased NASD arbitrators).
213. See supra notes 74-90 and accompanying text (discussing various theories
and assumptions including contracting inertia and assumptions that consumers rec-
tify contracting mistakes).
214. See Schmitz, supra note 92, at 123-27 (introducing this concept and analysis).
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perceptions, understandings, and negotiation of form contracts with
respect to a broad spectrum of contract terms, including arbitration
clauses. This article focuses only on questions and response data
from the survey regarding arbitration clauses. 215
1. Research Design and Implementation
After extensive research, editing, and testing, a roughly twenty-
minute survey consisting of four main sections was created, coded,
uploaded, and administered with the assistance of the Institute for
Behavioral Science ("IBS") at the University of Colorado.216 It was
then sent over the Internet to a total of 1,100 participants on Survey
Sampling International's ("SSI") panel of Colorado consumers over 18
years of age, and it ultimately reaped a research sample of 306 com-
pleted surveys from Colorado residents ages 18-88.217 Roughly one-
third of the respondents were male and two-thirds were female. 218
215. Future reports and publications will discuss the broader data.
216. See Amy J. Schmitz, Consumer Survey (Dec. 2007) (unpublished survey, on
file with author). Creation of the survey took some time with the planning and design
research, followed by editing and testing survey drafts in order to cure ambiguities
and errors and to uncover additional research queries and hypotheses. For example,
this involved several rounds of drafting surveys and administering them to students,
colleagues, and other volunteers to gather feedback and gauge ambiguities revealed
through inappropriate or inconsistent responses. I thank Michelle Walker for her in-
valuable assistance with this process.
217. Use of the SSI panel ensured confidentiality and full approval for conducting
the survey from the Human Research Council at the University of Colorado. In addi-
tion, the survey first was sent to 8,000 Colorado residents over 18 in SSI's research
panel between October 22 and 25, 2007, from which 8% responded. The responses
were then coded and correlated with the demographic information SSI had previously
gathered for the respondents through their assigned identifying numbers/codes. We
then dropped from our sample any responses that were not complete (i.e., the individ-
ual did not complete all pages of the survey), were completed in six minutes or less (an
unreasonably short time for this survey), skipped many or essential questions, "flat-
lined" responses (indicating lack of attention or accuracy), provided nonsensical an-
swers, or otherwise "cheated" in some way. We also checked the sample for overall
demographic balance and found underrepresentation of younger men. Accordingly,
we sent out between November 8 and November 13 an additional 2,000 invitations to
males 18-49 (from which we received a response rate of 2.5%), 1,000 reminders to
previously invited males 18-29 (from which we received a response rate of 1.5%), and
1,000 invitations to males 50+ (from which we received a response rate of 14%). We
then again dropped apparent "cheaters" using the same methodology we used for the
first group of responses, and we sent out additional reminders to males 18-45 in order
to fill out a sample of 300 Colorado consumers that was fairly balanced with the Colo-
rado census information we obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau. The process of
gathering and checking responses took over a month and allowed us to arrive at what
we believe is a solid sample.
218. Schmitz, Consumer Survey, supra note 216. Despite attempts to gather more
male responses, we learned that women are much more receptive to answering on-
line surveys.
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About half of these respondents were married, 7.5% lived with do-
mestic partners, and the remaining respondents were single, sepa-
rated, or widowed. 219 Three quarters of the sample identified
themselves as Caucasian or white, 10% as African American or black,
Hispanic or Latino, Asian, American Indian or Alaska Native, or mul-
tiple races, and the remaining respondents did not identify a racial
category. 220 The respondents had varying levels of education, with
43% earning Bachelor's or post-graduate degrees, 44% some college
but no degree, and the rest having a high school diploma or less.
Forty-two percent reported full-time employment, 16% reported part-
time jobs, and the rest reported no employment outside the home.221
2. Insights into Consumer Arbitration
Although the survey asked questions about consumers' con-
tracting behaviors and perceptions in general, it also included spe-
cific inquiries regarding arbitration and dispute resolution.
Specifically, the survey asked consumers if they read dispute resolu-
tion or arbitration terms. It also included arbitration or dispute reso-
lution terms among the list of terms in questions asking what, if any,
terms consumers have sought to negotiate or change. Furthermore,
the survey asked consumers to rank terms, including arbitration and
dispute resolution terms, on scales regarding perceived "fairness" and
"importance." The survey also asked consumers whether they have
noticed arbitration clauses in their contracts. 222
Roughly three-quarters of the survey respondents reported that
arbitration terms are "very" or "somewhat" important with respect to
their consumer purchases of personal or household products and ser-
vices. 223 However, only 39.6% of these chose "very important," while
the percentages of respondents that chose "very important" were
much higher with respect to price (83.2%), warranties (77.9%), fees
and penalties (72%), credit payment (74.7%), returns (66.6%), and
219. Schmitz, Consumer Survey, supra note 216, Demographic Information (see
infra Appendix A).
220. Id.
221. Many did not identify themselves with respect to occupation. Of the 82% of
those that reported income, roughly 30% were under $29,999, 30% $30,000-49,000,
19% $50,000-$74,999, 9.6% $75,000-$99,999, and 11.2% over $100,000. Id.
222. See Schmitz, Consumer Survey, supra note 216, Section II, Question 7 (see
infra Appendix B).
223. The question asked: "Think generally about the times when you have looked
at contract terms at any point with respect to your purchases of products or services.
Were any of the terms important to you? Indicate how you generally view the impor-
tance of the following types of terms." Id. Respondents could indicate "very impor-
tant," "somewhat important," "of minor importance," or "not important at all." Id.
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cancelling services (67.7%). Still, the percentage for arbitration
terms was not that far from that for disclaimers/waivers of liability
(48.4%) and was above that for freebies and incentives (27.1%).224
Survey respondents also were asked to "think broadly about how
fair (using [their] own sense of 'fairness') [they] view different con-
tracts and purchase terms, regardless of whether [they] have rele-
vant personal experiences."2 2 5 The question then listed types of
contracts and allowed respondents to rank these contracts according
to the following: "completely fair," "usually fair," "neutral/not fair or
unfair," "usually unfair," or "completely unfair."226 "Dispute or claim
settlement agreements" was among the types of contracts listed,
along with contracts ranging from gym memberships and standard
forms to apartment leases and contracts with friends. 227
When it came to dispute or settlement agreements, 32.7% replied
"completely" or "usually" fair, 44.6% were "neutral," and the remain-
der said "usually" or "completely" unfair. 228 Respondents replied
"usually" or "completely" fair at much higher rates regarding nearly
all of the other types of contracts, including warranties (62%), car
sales (57.4%), employment terms (68.5%), and company's standard
form contracts (57.9%). Only gym memberships generated more neg-
ative responses, with 31% reporting completely or usually unfair.229
This indicated that consumers are quite skeptical of dispute settle-
ment agreements, although these agreements may be viewed differ-
ently than simple arbitration clauses.
At the same time, consumers' reported perceptions are clouded
regarding arbitration to the extent that roughly half of the respon-
dents also said that they had not "seen or noticed anything about 'ar-
bitration' in any consumer purchase contract or terms" when buying
224. Responses of men and women were roughly the same with respect to the im-
portance of arbitration. See Schmitz, Consumer Survey, supra note 216, Section II,
Question 7, By Gender (see infra Appendix C).
225. See Schmitz, Consumer Survey, supra note 216, Section II, Question 8 (see
infra Appendix D).
226. Id.
227. Id. The other types of contracts were: health club or gym membership con-
tracts, company's standard form contracts or purchase terms, employment contracts
and handbooks, loan contracts, apartment leases, car sales contracts, credit card
terms, Internet purchase terms, warranties, cellular phone service contracts, con-
tracts with friends, and contracts with family members.
228. Id.
229. Id. The percentages reporting usually or completely fair with respect to the
remaining contracts listed were as follows: loan contracts (52.5%), apartment leases
(51.3%), credit card terms (39.1%), Internet purchase terms (44.6%), cell phone con-
tracts (37.2%), contracts with friends (40%), and contracts with family (41.2%).
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consumer goods or services. 230 In addition, only 11.4% reported that
they found arbitration or other private dispute resolution terms "im-
portant at some point with respect to a complaint or dispute."231
Nonetheless, consumers did not report that they found many terms
important with respect to later contract complaints. The only terms
many found important were warranties (56.9% said "yes"), returns
(50% said "yes"), and cancelling services (46.7% said "yes").23 2
In addition, respondents indicated that they are not proactive in
negotiating or changing form contract terms with respect to con-
sumer purchases: 71.3% of female and 53.4% of male respondents
reported that they "never" or "rarely" "try to negotiate or change such
form contracts or terms."2 33 In addition, only seven (4.4%) of those
that had ever successfully changed contracts reported changing arbi-
tration terms. 234 Respondents who had negotiated nonetheless indi-
cated that they had changed terms at much higher percentages with
respect to price (70.3%), warranties (25.9%), fees (38.6%), interest
rates for credit payment (29.1%), returns (25.3%), cancelling service
(20.3%), incentives (22.8%), and disclaimers/waivers of liability
(10.8%).235 However, these findings are again clouded by consumers'
lack of familiarity with or attention to arbitration generally. It is
therefore not surprising that they would not take time or resources to
negotiate arbitration terms.
Overall, this response data seems to comport with research find-
ings discussed above indicating that consumers generally care more
230. Schmitz, Consumer Survey, supra note 216, Section III, Question 7 (see infra
Appendices E and F). Specifically, 52.5% of the female respondents and 46.5% of the
male respondents responded "no" to the question of whether they "[hiad seen or no-
ticed anything about 'arbitration' in any consumer purchase contract or terms." Id.
231. Schmitz, Consumer Survey, supra note 216, Section III, Question 6 (see infra
Appendix G). The question asked: "Now think generally about any complaints or
disputes you have had regarding consumer purchases of products or services. What,
if any, terms have you found to be important at some point with respect to a com-
plaint or dispute? Check ALL that apply." This was followed by a list of terms, includ-
ing those for price, warranties, fees and other penalties, returning items, cancelling
services, "freebies" or incentives, and "Other" - or "N/A; I have never had a claim or
dispute." Id.
232. With respect to the other terms, respondents answered "yes" to importance in
percentages as follows: price (19.9%), fees/penalties (37.3%), interest rate/credit pay-
ment (21.6%), freebies/incentives (8.8%), and disclaimers/waivers (17.6%). Id.
233. Schmitz, Consumer Survey, supra note 216, Section III, Question 1, By Gen-
der (see infra Appendix H).
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about price- and quality-related contract terms than what they con-
sider less salient provisions, such as those regarding arbitration and
"freebies" or incentives. 236 However, it is unclear whether consumers
truly understand the impact of arbitration provisions. Consumers
may be more attentive to arbitration terms if they know how these
terms may curtail their warranty and other remedy rights.
For example, the majority of respondents indicated through their
responses to a scenario question that they would like a salesperson to
explain arbitration terms to them in making a consumer purchase.
Specifically, respondents were asked to imagine they had chosen a
car they wished to purchase and were given a five-page contract to
sign to finalize the deal. They were then provided a list of purchase
terms and asked to "check all the terms that [they] would want the
salesperson to explain."237 The results were that 57.1% of female and
53.4% of male respondents (55.9% overall) checked that they would
want terms requiring that they "resolve claims through private
means such as 'arbitration' instead of 'bringing claims to court" ex-
plained to them. 238 This was a higher overall rate than that for in-
centives (48.7%) and general boilerplate (41.5%), and not far below
that for technical/legal words (60.1%). Nonetheless, respondents said
they desired explanation at higher percentages with respect to price
(72.5%), warranties (92.2%), fees/penalties (84%), interest rate for
payment (75.2%), returns (76.1%), and disclaimers (75.2%).239 It is
not surprising that consumers who do not notice arbitration clauses
would be less interested in explanation of these clauses than the
terms that already pique their attention.
Of course, this research is limited in scope. However, it provides
a view into consumers' contracting regarding arbitration clauses.240
The results indicate some negative perceptions of arbitration clauses,
236. See supra notes 98-113 and accompanying text (discussing others' findings
that consumers focus on price-related and other "salient" terms).
237. Schmitz, Consumer Survey, supra note 216, Section III, Question 3 (see infra
Appendices J and K).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. As with any survey research, it is subject to interpretation differences as well
as perception and other cognitive biases. People read and interpret questions differ-
ently, regardless of how "clear" or sanitized the questions are. Furthermore, people
have a natural propensity to believe that their views are the "normal" views even
when they are not. See Lawrence Solan et al., False Consensus Bias in Contract Inter-
pretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1268, 1278-1300 (2008) (explaining false consensus
bias and how it applies in contract interpretation contexts).
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coupled with lack of attention or understanding regarding arbitra-
tion. This creates a somewhat circular contracting dynamic. 241 Con-
sumers do not pay attention to arbitration clauses, which leaves
companies free to skew arbitration provisions to their own advantage
without consumers even noticing. At the same time, consumers may
distrust arbitration clauses due in part to their lack of understanding
or experience with respect to arbitration. These negative assump-
tions then fuel a sense of helplessness that may perpetuate this cycle
by further dissuading consumers from reading or negotiating arbitra-
tion clauses. Conspicuous and informative arbitration disclosures
may help address this dynamic by making arbitration more accessi-
ble and helping consumers understand how they can confront or navi-
gate arbitration terms.
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTEXTUAL AND
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
Most legislative proposals for arbitration reform, such as the Ar-
bitration Fairness Act ("AFA"), call for an all-out ban on pre-dispute
arbitration agreements in certain contexts. 242 These proposals may
be overbroad and misguided, however, because they rarely address
the salient contextual and empirical research regarding consumers'
contracting behavior and understanding of arbitration.243 Further-
more, this research is vital for prescribing arbitration disclosures,
which this article focuses on as a fairly uncontroversial first step in
regulating arbitration. Disclosures will nonetheless have little value
unless they account for consumers' contracting behavior, awareness,
and understanding with respect to arbitration clauses.
241. See supra notes 65-93 and accompanying text (discussing theories regarding
consumer contracting behavior).
242. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009). See also
Note, Recent Developments - Access to Courts, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses: Pro-
posals for Reform of Consumer-Defendant Arbitration, 122 HARv. L. REV. 1151, 1170-
81 (2009) [hereinafter Access to Courts] (discussing the Act and critiquing its blanket
approach).
243. See Bar-Gill, supra note 17, at 31-32 (emphasizing how "[1legal intervention
should be based on robust evidence of consumer mistakes leading to substantial wel-
fare costs" and that the evidence should be market-specific).
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A. Contextual Considerations for Arbitration Reforms
The recently reintroduced AFA is indicative of the legislative
proposals that broadly bar pre-dispute arbitration clauses in tradi-
tionally uneven bargaining contexts; the AFA targets the employ-
ment, consumer, franchise, and civil rights areas.2 44 The AFA also
reverses the "separability" rule by requiring courts to consider all is-
sues going to the arbitration clause and/or the contract as a whole. 245
Although the Act has died in committee in the past, it may have new
life with recent political changes in Congress and increasing stories of
arbitration abuse.2 46
As in the past, the Act is proposed based on a rote list of "find-
ings" that includes statements that "most" consumers have no choice
but to accept arbitration clauses in their purchases, arbitration un-
dermines public law, and the process gives companies "near complete
freedom to ignore the law and even their own rules."24 7 The findings
also state that arbitration providers "are sometimes under great
pressure to devise systems that favor the corporate repeat players
who decide whether those companies will receive their lucrative busi-
ness" and lament that courts uphold "egregiously unfair mandatory
arbitration clauses."2 48
Research does confirm that some companies have used pre-dis-
pute arbitration clauses in non-negotiable form contracts to their un-
fair advantage. 24 9 My and others' studies have shown that in certain
244. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009).
245. Id. See also supra note 44 and accompanying text (briefly explaining this rule
and citing relevant authorities).
246. This bill has been proposed in the past but has had little success. See, e.g.,
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782 & H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007) (primarily
sponsored by Sen. Russ Feingold (D-Wis.) and Rep. Hank Johnson (D-Ga.) but never
passed); H.R. 3651, 109th Cong. (2005) (failed bill to amend the FAA to preclude arbi-
tration of employment disputes unless the employee and employer agree to arbitrate
after the dispute arises); H.R. 2969, 109th Cong. (2005) (another bill lost in committee
to preclude enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in employment con-
tracts). However, Rep. Johnson recently reintroduced the bill in the House of Repre-
sentatives with more than 35 co-sponsors. Rep. Johnson Seeks to Strengthen
Consumer, Employee Rights, Feb. 12, 2009, http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ga
04johnson/2009 02_12_arbitration fairness-drops.html (noting optimism for pas-
sage of the bill due to momentum and 35 original cosponsors). Campaigns for its pas-
sage have begun. See, e.g., Pete Mackey, The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 - Get
Behind It, Feb. 10, 2009, http://mobile.injuryboard.com/miscellaneous/the-arbitra
tion-fairness-act-of-2009-get-behind-it.aspx.
247. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009) (stating find-
ings in Section 2).
248. Id.
249. See supra notes 117-33 and accompanying text (describing the limited re-
search regarding companies' use of arbitration clauses).
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areas such as credit card and wireless service contracts, many compa-
nies often preclude class proceedings and effectively lead consumers
to forego legal rights or bear the high costs of individual arbitration
proceedings. 250 Furthermore, many courts uphold arbitration
clauses with suspect procedural terms under the pro-enforcement
gloss of the FAA. 251 As the AFA findings suggest, policymakers and
consumers have negative perceptions of form contracts and
arbitration.
It is nonetheless debatable whether the Act's findings and con-
sumer negativity regarding arbitration are entirely warranted.
Many consumer arbitration agreements are reasonable and may ben-
efit both companies and consumers.25 2 In addition, there is evidence
that consumers often are more likely to get some recovery in arbitra-
tion over litigation and have been satisfied with arbitration proceed-
ings overall. 253 It may be unwarranted to assume that the fairly
large pool of arbitrators competing for clients would risk looking in-
competent and losing business by ignoring proper legal and equitable
rules.
2 5 4
Moreover, many arbitration providers promulgate consumer-
friendly rules, and there is evidence that many companies voluntarily
comply with those rules or do so under the urgings of the AAA or
other arbitration providers. 255 The AAA reports that it will not ad-
minister arbitration proceedings in accordance with clauses requiring
250. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text (discussing studies comparing
companies' use of arbitration clauses in consumer versus non-consumer contracts); see
also In re Am. Express Merchs.' Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 300-09 (2d. Cir. 2009) (holding
that a ban on class-wide arbitration in credit card agreements was unenforceable be-
cause it would effectively insulate American Express from antitrust liability by cut-
ting off consumers' only meaningful access to recovery).
251. See supra notes 36-64 and accompanying text (describing courts' treatment of
arbitration clauses).
252. See supra Part IV.A (discussing fair arbitration terms in some of the con-
tracts gathered).
253. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text (discussing studies indicating
favorable results for consumers who arbitrate their claims).
254. See Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of Cyber Law: Norms, Prop-
erty Rights, Contracting, Dispute Resolution and Enforcement Without the State, 1
J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 269, 287 (2005) (noting arbitrators' incentives for remaining neu-
tral and properly applying relevant rules and norms in order to garner respect, gener-
ate business, and be successful); Christopher R. Drahozal, Commercial Norms,
Commercial Codes, and International Commercial Arbitration, 33 VAND. J. TRANs-
NAT'L L. 79, 105-106 (2000) ("The competition among arbitrators gives them different
incentives than public court judges, who generally do not compete to attract
litigation.").
255. John Flynn Rooney, Study Finds that Arbitration Process Yields Benefits,
Cm. DALy L. BuL., Mar. 13, 2009, at 1 (reporting a study finding that 98.2% of the
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consumers to pay all arbitration costs and fees. 25 6 At the same time,
post-dispute arbitration agreements are rare in consumer cases and
companies cannot rely on or pass along cost-savings based on hopes
consumers will agree to arbitrate after claims develop. 257 It therefore
would be imprudent to bar pre-dispute arbitration clauses in all con-
sumer cases.
Some companies' problematic use of arbitration still provides
reason for consumers' and AFA supporters' negativity. Clear regula-
tion may help clarify uncertain case law, which has failed to provide
sufficient guidance for companies drafting arbitration clauses and
consumers seeking to challenge those clauses. 258 Furthermore, tech-
nological complexities of e-contracting and their increasing inclusion
of arbitration clauses add to the uncertainty and resulting litiga-
tion. 259 At the same time, most arbitration policy discussions are
flawed to the extent that they ignore empirical research, and instead
hinge on interested parties' advocacy for their positions based on
solicited stories and testimonials. 260 For example, the "findings" in
the AFA appear to be based on little more than position statements
consumer arbitration clauses that came before the AAA during the study period com-
plied with their consumer protocols or the AAA took appropriate corrective action).
256. See Am. Arbitration Ass'n, AAA Review of Consumer Clauses, http://www.
adr.org/si.asp?id=4453 (last visited Feb. 27, 2008) (stating the AAA's refusal to ad-
minister arbitration proceedings pursuant to consumer clauses that do not comply
with their due process protocol).
257. Others have argued that the AFA approach of barring enforcement of pre-
dispute arbitration clauses in broad and ill-defined categories was both over- and
under-inclusive, and that it may be more beneficial to legislate procedural reforms.
See, e.g., Recent Proposed Legislation, Arbitration - Congress Considers Bill to Invali-
date Pre-Dispute Arbitration Clauses for Consumers, Employees, and Franchisees -
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, § 1782, 110th Cong. (2007), 121 HARv. L. REV. 2262,
2267-68 (2008) (critiquing the Act's broad scope and approach); Access to Courts,
supra note 242, at 1175-77 (explaining how banning pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ments prevents cost-reducing effects of pre-dispute arbitration clauses and will de-
crease both companies' and consumers' abilities to vindicate their rights).
258. See Clayton P. Gillette, Pre-Approved Contracts for Internet Commerce, 42
Hous. L. REV. 975, 978-83 (2005) (noting how especially with respect to arbitration
clauses, courts have varied widely in their approaches and responses, resulting in
uncertainty and inefficiency).
259. Id. (highlighting how courts struggle with emerging acceptance and enforce-
ment issues regarding e-contracts and lack resources to address underlying techno-
logical issues).
260. See id. at 1008-10 (explaining why consumer interest group leaders advocate
for flat prohibitions on arbitration clauses based on testimony of those that have suf-
fered most, even when consumers as a whole may benefit from these clauses and
would be better served by a more balanced approach); Bar-Gill, supra note 17, at 31-
32 (discussing need for context-specific research in designing regulations).
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and featured testimony by advocacy groups and arbitration commen-
tators.261 It is difficult to decipher what Congress even considers due
to the volume of press releases and advocacy statements added to the
Congressional Record. 262 It appears that any studies Congress may
have considered were limited, inconclusive, or fairly uninformative
with respect to how reforms should be designed to capture the most
"bang for the buck."263
Reforms should aim to address the real problems with consumer
arbitration, as well as their likely impacts on company and court
costs. Federal and state judicial budgets are tight, and the AFA may
increase courts' loads. Courts may not have resources to handle addi-
tional consumer, employment, and franchise cases that would no
longer be arbitrated in the wake of the AFA's passage. Companies
facing significant shortfalls and possible bankruptcies also may not
have the wherewithal to shoulder increased dispute resolution costs.
Moreover, regardless of one's lack of sympathy for these companies,
policymakers must consider the impacts of company costs and cut-
backs on their prices, quality of goods/services, employees, and
stockholders.
Arbitration regulations should therefore seek to promote proce-
dural fairness through protections aimed to be most cost-effective.
This is a tall order: it is difficult to know what impact any regula-
tions will have until after they have been tested. However, consider-
ation of empirical research can aid policymakers in crafting
regulations that are at least more likely to serve fairness and effi-
ciency interests than those based solely on theory and assump-
tions.264 This research should include not only studies of gathered
contract terms and arbitration outcomes, but also studies of consum-
ers' contracting awareness, understandings, and behaviors.
261. See, e.g., William B.L. Little, Fairness is in the Eyes of the Beholder, 60 BAY-
LOR L. REV. 73, 146-51 (2008) (discussing the 2007 Act's broad "findings," how the
Act's sweeping scope would impact securities arbitration, and the politics surrounding
its consideration); see also Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong.
(2009) (incorporating identical findings).
262. See Little, supra note 261, at 146-51 (discussing the various statements and
press releases pro- and anti-arbitration forces added to the record).
263. Id. (noting the limited and possibly skewed studies presented to the Congres-
sional subcommittee considering the Act regarding securities arbitration alone). See
also Gillette, supra note 258, at 1008-10 (noting how advocates sometimes skew their
reports to suit their positions).
264. See Bar-Gill, supra note 17, at 31-32, 35-38 (highlighting the need for contex-
tual research in regulating contracts).
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B. Arbitration Disclosures Tailored for Consumers' Contract
Behavior
Deep empirical evidence should be considered in crafting a wide
spectrum of arbitration reforms. This may include varied procedural
regulations such as those I have proposed in the past for requiring
companies to comply with the 1998 Consumer Due Process Protocol,
which calls for clear notice of arbitration clauses, provision of infor-
mation regarding the arbitration process, preservation of consumers'
access to small claims court, limits on consumer costs, and convenient
hearing locations. 265 Nonetheless, this article focuses only on the de-
sign of arbitration disclosure regulations. This is because such dis-
closures are fairly inexpensive and enhance contractual assent
instead of curtailing freedom of contract.266 Disclosures are also less
controversial than substantive limits: commentators and policymak-
ers with different political and theoretical viewpoints generally sup-
port disclosures. 267
Consideration of contracting behavior research is fundamental in
crafting disclosure rules because those rules' impact is directly tied to
whether consumers will read, understand, and utilize any required
disclosures. In the mortgage context, for example, commentators
have argued that more behavioral research is necessary in prescrib-
ing disclosure reforms that account for consumers' contracting biases
and behaviors. 268 Disclosures are not worth their costs if they fail to
help consumers shop for goods and services. 269 Furthermore, policy-
makers must consider whether consumers' biases may cause them to
265. Nat'l Consumer Disputes Advisory Comm., Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Consumer
Due Process Protocol, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22019 (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).
Again, procedural protections beyond disclosure may be warranted. However, full
discussion of such protections has been discussed elsewhere and is beyond the scope of
this paper. See, e.g., Schmitz, Warranty Woes, supra note 9, at 661-86 (discussing
additional reforms and regulations for consumer arbitration); Schmitz, Deference,
supra note 9, at 37-57 (proposing procedural reforms in lieu of a wholesale ban on
enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer contracts).
266. See Hillman, supra note 96, at 838-39, 846-48 (discussing the low cost of dis-
closure and compliance with Llewellyn's assent theory underlying U.C.C. Article 2).
267. See Bar-Gill, supra note 17, at 31-32, 35-38 (noting how economic and behav-
ioral scholars generally support disclosures but disagree on the scope of such inter-
vention in contracts).
268. Michael S. Barr et al., Behaviorally Informed Home Mortgage Regulation 6-
12 (Apr. 15, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, available at SSRN: http://papers.ssrn.
comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1121199) (arguing for more consideration of con-
sumers' psychology in crafting reforms).
269. Id. at 7-10.
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contract in economically "irrational" ways regardless of whether they
read the disclosures.270
Similarly, mandatory notice provisions for arbitration clauses
will have little impact if consumers do not read or understand them.
This is a valid concern in light of the consumers' responses in my
study indicating a general lack of attention to, or experience with,
arbitration clauses. Nearly ninety percent of the respondents re-
ported that they did not see arbitration terms as important although
these terms are often central in claims resolution.271 In addition, de-
spite respondents' reported distrust of dispute settlement terms, very
few of the respondents indicated that they had negotiated or changed
contract terms pertaining to arbitration or dispute resolution. 272
Other research similarly suggests that most consumers do not
read their contracts in general, and even consumers who read salient
terms may be dissuaded from reading arbitration provisions. 273 Con-
sumers' contracting inertia, irrational optimism regarding the likeli-
hood of future claims, and feelings of powerlessness may prevent
them from questioning or negotiating arbitration clauses even if they
are well-disclosed. 27 4 Regulations may have little impact if compa-
nies can ostensibly comply with disclosure rules but use inexpensive
strategies to shroud the disclosures. 27 5
Poorly designed mandatory disclosures may therefore increase
companies' contracting costs without providing real consumer protec-
tion benefits. Companies faced with new regulations would likely in-
cur costs engaging counsel to provide legal advice regarding the new
rules. They also may incur costs implementing revised contracts and
perhaps adjusting on-line and paper contract delivery to ensure com-
pliance. In addition, although such regulations may claim to clarify
enforceability requirements for arbitration clauses, they may none-
theless backfire by fueling litigation regarding their interpretation
and application.
270. Id.
271. See supra notes 216-41 and accompanying text (explaining results from my
survey).
272. See supra notes 188-211, 233-35 and accompanying text (discussing findings
from my empirical studies).
273. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text (highlighting studies indicating
signaling power of contracts and the effects of information overload on consumers'
propensity to read and give proper weight to e-contracts loaded with form terms).
274. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (noting power issues in com-
pany/consumer relations).
275. See Hillman, supra note 96, at 842-44 (discussing why consumers do not read
contracts).
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That is not to say that policymakers should not prescribe arbitra-
tion disclosure rules. Carefully tailored regulations would be worth
their costs to address consumers' lack of attention and education re-
garding arbitration clauses and some companies' harsh use of arbi-
tration to effectively evade consumer liability. It is not surprising
that consumers who lack knowledge, experience, and power with re-
spect to arbitration do not read or seek to change arbitration
terms. 276 Most consumers in my study reported that they had not
noticed arbitration clauses in their contracts, although they are likely
subject to these clauses in their credit card and wireless service con-
tracts. 277 Notice must therefore be coupled with information about
arbitration's impact in order to raise consumers' interest in arbitra-
tion clauses and awareness regarding the clauses' preclusion of class
actions.278 The majority of respondents in my study who said they
would want a salesperson to explain arbitration terms in a car
purchase would likely be even higher if those respondents understood
the terms' impact on their rights.279
At the same time, evidence that companies include arbitration
clauses and class relief waivers in their consumer contracts, but not
in their other business agreements, raises questions regarding claims
that companies simply use arbitration as a superior method for
resolving their disputes. 280 Instead, this evidence suggests that com-
panies strategically use arbitration clauses to cut off class claims and
thereby limit or preclude consumer recovery. 281 This was an aspect
of arbitration clauses participants in my focus groups did not realize
but were eager to learn more about.28 2
276. See supra notes 188-211, 233-35 and accompanying text (providing findings
from my study).
277. See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text (discussing findings from my
e-survey regarding lack of notice regarding arbitration clauses and my analysis of
contracts in these consumer contexts).
278. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing Eisenberg et al.'s re-
search regarding arbitration clauses and class waivers in consumer contracts).
Courts also voice concerns with harsh use of class arbitration waivers. See In re Am.
Express Merchs.' Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 300-309 (2d Cir. 2009) (refusing to enforce a
ban on class-wide arbitration in credit card agreements).
279. See supra notes 217-241 and accompanying text (providing results of my e-
survey); see also supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text (discussing focus group
discussions in which consumers were surprised and concerned regarding arbitration
clauses' impact on their rights to go to court).
280. See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text (exploring research indicating
companies' strategic use of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts).
281. Id.
282. See supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text (discussing my focus group
research and respondents' surprise to learn that arbitration clauses curtail their
rights to go to court).
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What does all this mean for arbitration disclosures? First, com-
panies that use arbitration provisions in their consumer contracts
should be required to plainly and conspicuously give notice of the pro-
vision and its impact on litigation and class proceedings. This must
be pursuant to clear disclosure rules that do not invite litigation re-
garding their meaning and enforcement. In addition, the rules
should require companies to follow the notice with information about
the required arbitration process in order to ease companies' onerous
use of arbitration and consumers' negativity toward the process. The
mandatory nature of the rules also should put an end to some compa-
nies' unwillingness to provide consumers with pre-purchase copies of
their contract terms and the practice of shrouding arbitration clauses
in bill stuffers and complicated website links. Accordingly, arbitra-
tion disclosure regulations should go beyond prescribing a "reasona-
bleness" standard to specify that companies using arbitration clauses
must provide consumers with basic information about how the arbi-
tration process works, its likely costs, how an arbitration clause may
curtail class action and jury rights, and whom to contact for filing
claims and gathering further information. 28 3 Nonetheless, the disclo-
sures should not cause information overload. Consumers rationally
weigh the value of their time and choose not to read long or convo-
luted contracts.28 4
Regulations should require conspicuous provision of this arbitra-
tion information in a concise and readable format. 28 5 Specifically, ar-
bitration disclosures could be included in a simple grid similar to the
Truth in Lending Act's ("TILA") grid, or "Schumer Box," which lend-
ers must include in their loan agreements to disclose applicable fee
and interest information. 28 6 A few companies already provide arbi-
tration information in such a grid in their form contracts, and others
283. With respect to credit contracts, some have advanced an objective reasonable-
ness standard for disclosures that would require lenders to meaningfully convey nec-
essary information in light of typical consumers' psychological biases. See Bar-Gill,
supra note 17, at 32-44 (further discussing a proposal for a more considered approach
for crafting disclosure reforms calculated to have real impact). Vague "reasonable-
ness" standards, however, often raise more questions than they answer. See Schmitz,
Warranty Woes, supra note 9, at 628-30 (discussing need for procedural disclosure
protections in MMWA consumer arbitration).
284. See Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra note 12, at 20-21 (discussing their find-
ings supporting other evidence that consumers place great importance on contract
length in deciding whether to take time to read their contracts).
285. Id. at 20-21 (proposing that regulations should aim to shorten contracts).
286. See Bar-Gill, supra note 17, at 35-37 (discussing TILA disclosures and the
"Schumer Box"); 15 U.S.C.A. § 1604(b) (West 2008) (requiring the Federal Reserve to
promulgate model disclosure forms and clauses to facilitate mandatory disclosure in
common transactions); 12 C.F.R. pt. 226 app. G-10 (2009) (providing model disclosure
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could cheaply incorporate a grid using a legislative model. 2 7 This
would be more noticeable and understandable than the typically long
and unreadable arbitration clauses most companies use.288 It also
would be more readable than a paragraph of ostensibly conspicuous
disclosures in all bold or capital letters.28 9
At the same time, these disclosures could be posted on a central
website to allow for easy comparison. This could dovetail with pro-
posals for broader central disclosure of consumer contract terms and
be included on a website that consumers could access to compare
companies' terms for common products such as wireless phone ser-
vice and credit cards.290 Indeed, there are already Internet sites for
consumers to compare general aspects of companies' wireless service
options (i.e., plan minutes, area coverage, costs, phones, etc.). These
sites also could include companies' arbitration requirements, giving
consumers a better opportunity to "shop around" for these contract
terms. 291
Although consumers may not make purchasing decisions based
on comparison of arbitration terms per se, central disclosure may at
least foster transparency and education regarding the arbitration
process. Disclosure would enhance arbitration awareness by signal-
ing its importance, which may prompt consumers to question and
forms and clauses for common consumer transactions); 15 U.S.C.A. § 1602(u) (West
2008) (defining required disclosures in credit context as the annual percentage rate,
method of determining the finance charge and amount of balance upon which the
charge will be imposed, amount of the finance charge, the amount to be financed, total
of payments, the number and amount of payments, and dates for repayment of indebt-
edness); 12 C.F.R. pt. 226 app. G-10(A) (2009) (providing model forms for credit card
applications and solicitations).
287. For example, administrative regulations set out a sample form for the credit
or charge card disclosures issuers must provide under 12 C.F.R. § 226.5a on or with a
solicitation or an application to open a credit or charge card account. Model Forms
and Clauses, Applications and Solicitations Sample (Credit Cards), 12 C.F.R. pt. 226,
App. G-10(B) (2008) (form included a succinct and readable grid format for the disclo-
sures of interest rates and fees). A similar model grid could be used in consumer
contracts for disclosing key information regarding the contracts' arbitration require-
ments. See Collected Arbitration Provisions, supra note 153 (some contracts included
pertinent information in a chart or grid form).
288. See supra notes 161-66 and accompanying text (describing the arbitration
clauses I encountered in my review of cell phone and credit card contracts).
289. See Laura Schocker, Why do CAPITAL LETTERS So Annoy Us?, BBC NEWS
MAG., Sept. 3, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk news/magazine/8234637.stm (dis-
cussing some studies indicating that block capitals may be difficult to read and may
be considered "shorthand for screaming" when used on-line).
290. See Hillman, supra note 96, at 846-54 (discussing the pros and cons of
mandatory website disclosure of boilerplate terms in companies' e-contracts).
291. See Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra note 12, at 20-21 (noting options for con-
tract term disclosure on the Internet).
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perhaps join together to resist or change overly burdensome arbitra-
tion terms or choose to shop elsewhere. In addition, central disclo-
sure may raise "red flags" for regulators and watchdog groups
regarding harsh arbitration terms and give sellers incentives to use
and publicize more consumer-friendly arbitration procedures. 292
This, in turn, may improve consumer trust in arbitration and form
contracts.
Concerns would remain that some companies would decide that
they would reap greater benefits from onerous contract terms than
from fostering goodwill through disclosure of reasonable terms. Fur-
thermore, even if mandatory website disclosure provides companies
with incentives to avoid particularly harsh terms, it may not dis-
suade them from drafting contracts with possible anti-consumer im-
pacts.293 Courts also may view companies' compliance with
mandatory disclosure rules as reason to provide disclosed contracts
with a safe harbor from unconscionablility review. It would be diffi-
cult for a consumer to argue that a contract is procedurally uncon-
scionable if the consumer has access to the terms through the
companies' or a central website. 294
Nonetheless, these possible drawbacks to disclosure and central
Internet posting are not insurmountable and do not outweigh their
potential benefits. Disclosure may foster companies' adoption of rea-
sonable arbitration practices and terms in order to avoid consumer
challenges and the gaze of watchdog groups such as Consumers
Union that are already vigilant of arbitration clauses. 295 Companies
and their attorneys must keep apprised of acceptable arbitration
292. Id. (noting how reputation concerns may prompt contractual fairness). See
also Hillman, supra note 96, at 853-54 (noting how watchdog groups may give compa-
nies an incentive to contract fairly, but this incentive may be insufficient to prevent
companies from "drafting marginal terms that may not create significant reputational
concerns but would harm consumers just the same").
293. See Hillman, supra note 96, at 854-55.
294. See, e.g., Margae, Inc. v. Clear Link Techs., LLC, No. 2:07-CV-916 TC, 2008
WL 2465450, at *2-4, *6-7 (D. Utah June 16, 2008) (finding that an arbitration clause
in amended terms posted on a company's website after the customer clicked "I accept"
for the original e-contract was binding on the customer because the customer bore the
burden to monitor the company's website for any changes allowed under the original
contract).
295. See, e.g., Press Release, Consumers Union Backs Arbitration Reform Package
(Mar. 11, 2002), available at http://www.consumersunion.orgtfinance/reformwc302.
htm (discussing the widely-respected publisher of CONSUMER REPORTS' support for ar-
bitration reforms to address problems with arbitration clauses that curb consumers'
access to remedies).
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terms, considering that courts compare companies' practices in as-
sessing enforcement of arbitration. 2 96 In addition, disclosure through
a grid breaking down key elements of arbitration proceedings would
alert consumers to their importance and make it more difficult for
companies to draft marginal terms that may otherwise escape notice
through confusing language. Furthermore, although safe harbor ef-
fects of disclosure rules may squelch a few valid claims, this would
hinder unfounded arbitration challenges and ease the current uncer-
tainties and inefficiencies of these lawsuits.
29 7
Policymakers also could augment central posting with an ap-
proval system for companies' consumer arbitration clauses. 298 This
could be similar to contract approval systems adopted elsewhere. For
example, the Israeli Standard Contracts Law encourages sellers to
submit their form contract terms to an administrative tribunal for
approval. If terms are approved, they are then provided a safe harbor
from judicial invalidation.2 99 This process encourages reasonable
form contracts, although it has received some criticism to the extent
its voluntary nature allows companies to choose anti-consumer con-
tracting over pre-approval. 30 0 Nonetheless, an arbitration term ap-
proval system could be mandatory to ensure compliance, and use of
the Internet would keep administrative costs to a minimum.
296. See, e.g., Cicle v. Chase Bank USA, 583 F.3d 549, 554-57 (8th Cir. 2009) (care-
fully distinguishing an arbitration provision in a credit card agreement from other
cases in upholding the provision that included a thirty-day opt-out and small claims
carve-out); Harris v. DirectTV Group, Inc., No. 1 07-C-3650, 2008 WL 342973, at *1-3
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 5, 2008) (highlighting how the 2006 arbitration provision at issue pro-
vided clearer notice than the unenforceable 1999 provision in upholding the cable
company's arbitration clause); Legair v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 213 Fed. App'x 436,
439 (6th Cir. 2007) (distinguishing this case from other cases holding employment
arbitration agreements unconscionable because here, Circuit City's arbitration agree-
ment included an opt-out provision and employees were provided with notice and in-
formation about arbitration).
297. See supra notes 36-64 and accompanying text (discussing uncertainty and
inefficiency of the current case-by-case analysis).
298. See Gillette, supra note 258, at 983-88 (discussing and analyzing proposals
for an administrative disclosure and approval system for form contracts); Ty Tasker &
Daryn Pakcyk, Cyber-Surfing on the High Seas of Legalese: Law and Technology of
Internet Agreements, 18 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 79, 145-47 (2008) (suggesting need for
rules requiring clear notice of contract terms for e-contracts).
299. Gillette, supra note 258, at 983-88 (noting the Israeli and European Commu-
nity examples of such processes).
300. Voluntary systems are less intrusive on contractual liberty, but they are
problematic to the extent that companies may find it more profitable to forego the
system and continue using harsh terms. See id. at 987-89, 1012-13 (highlighting
drawbacks of a voluntary approval system, problems of encouraging sellers to use the
process, and administrative capture concerns).
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These are only some ideas to consider. The key is to continually
digest the full panoply of research in designing disclosure reforms,
instead of focusing on political bravado and advocacy statements.
Disclosures should account for the extent consumers read and under-
stand arbitration clauses, as well as consumers' contracting behav-
iors and biases. Policymakers can start by considering the current
empirical evidence and gathering further research to fill in the gaps.
VI. CONCLUSION
Consumer advocates call for abolition of pre-dispute arbitration
clauses, while industry groups oppose any regulation of contractual
freedom. The problem is that policymakers on both sides of the de-
bate stake their positions and design proposed reforms in the dark by
clinging to politically-motivated statements and limited studies sup-
porting their views. They rarely consider a full range of behavioral
and empirical research necessary for crafting cost-effective regula-
tions. Failure to consider this research is especially problematic with
respect to arbitration disclosures. Disclosures are meaningless if con-
sumers do not read or understand them. This article highlights the
importance of deep behavioral and empirical research in designing
arbitration disclosure rules and considers how rules may be tailored
in light of others' and my own empirical studies to provide optimal
consumer protection benefits for the attendant costs.
Research confirms behavioral theorists' predictions that consum-
ers generally do not read or negotiate their contracts, and even con-
sumers who skim contracts for provisions they deem salient are
unlikely to read arbitration terms due to lack of understanding or
experience with arbitration. Arbitration disclosures will therefore
have little impact unless they are presented in a manner that signals
their importance and provides sufficient information regarding the
applicable arbitration process and its impact on consumer rights.
Disclosures also must be clear and concise, which could be accom-
plished using a grid format like the TILA's "Schumer Box." In addi-
tion, arbitration provisions could be centrally posted on the Internet
in order to foster awareness and comparison shopping, and to incen-
tivize companies' use of consumer-friendly procedures. Nonetheless,
these are initial ideas: more empirical research and discussion are
necessary to further illuminate optimal regulatory design.
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APPENDiX A: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid 18-24 yrs old 19 6.2 6.2 6.2
25-29 yrs old 16 5.2 5.2 11.4
30-39 yrs old 40 13.1 13.1 24.5
40-49 yrs old 73 23.9 23.9 48.4
50-59 yrs old 81 26.5 26.5 74.8
60-69 yrs old 54 17.6 17.6 92.5
70 yrs or over 23 7.5 7.5 100.0
Total 306 100.0 100.0
Annual Household Income
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Less than $20,000 43 14.1 17.1 17.1
$20,000-$29,999 33 10.8 13.1 30.3
$30,000-$39,999 43 14.1 17.1 47.4
$40,000-$49,999 32 10.5 12.7 60.2
$50,000-$59,999 22 7.2 8.8 68.9
$60,000-$74,999 26 8.5 10.4 79.3
$75,000-$99,999 24 7.8 9.6 88.8
$100,000-$149,999 23 7.5 9.2 98.0
$150,000+ 5 1.6 2.0 100.0
Total 251 82.0 100.0




Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Single, Never Married 58 19.0 19.0 19.0
Married 150 49.0 49.0 68.0
Separated/Divorced/Widowed 75 24.5 24.5 92.5
Domestic Partnership 23 7.5 7.5 100.0
Total 306 100.0 100.0
Employment Status
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Full-Time 129 42.2 42.2 42.2
Part-Time 49 16.0 16.0 58.2
Not Employed 128 41.8 41.8 100.0
Total 306 100.0 100.0
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Education Level
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Some High School 5 1.6 1.6 1.6
High School Graduate 34 11.1 11.1 12.7
Some College 135 44.1 44.1 56.9
College Degree 78 25.5 25.5 82.4
Some Post-Graduate 17 5.6 5.6 87.9
Master's Degree 27 8.8 8.8 96.7
Ph.D./Law/Professional Degree 10 3.3 3.3 100.0
Total 306 100.0 100.0
Respondent Occupation
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Executive/Upper Management 12 3.9 4.5 4.5
IT/MIS Professional 11 3.6 4.1 8.6
Doctor/Surgeon 2 .7 .7 9.4
Educator 11 3.6 4.1 13.5
Homemaker 33 10.8 12.4 25.8
Student 13 4.2 4.9 30.7
None of Above 168 54.9 62.9 93.6
Small Business Owner 17 5.6 6.4 100.0
Total 267 87.3 100.0




Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Unspecified 45 14.7 14.7 14.7
Other 6 2.0 2.0 16.7
Hispanic 6 2.0 2.0 18.6
Multi: Hispanic/Other 2 .7 .7 19.3
Pacific Islander 2 .7 .7 19.9
Native American/
American Indian 2 .7 .7 20.6
Multi: Hispanic/Native
American/American Indian 1 .3 .3 20.9
Asian 3 1.0 1.0 21.9
Black 2 .7 .7 22.5
White 228 74.5 74.5 97.1
Multi: White/Other 1 .3 .3 97.4
Multi: White/Hispanic 4 1.3 1.3 98.7
Multi: White/Pacific
Islander/Hispanic 1 .3 .3 99.0
Multi: White/Native
American/American Indian 2 .7 .7 99.7
Multi: White/Native
American/American
Indian/Hispanic 1 .3 .3 100.0
Total 306 100.0 100.0
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APPENDIX B: SECTION II, QUESTION 7
Participants were asked to "[t]hink generally about the times
when you have looked at contract terms at any point with respect to
your purchases of products or services. Were any of the terms impor-
tant to you?" Participant responses as to how important they viewed
the various contract terms are presented below.
Price
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Very Important 252 82.4 83.2 83.2
Somewhat Important 50 16.3 16.5 99.7
Minor Importance 1 .3 .3 100.0
Total 303 99.0 100.0




Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Very Important 236 77.1 77.9 77.9
Somewhat Important 61 19.9 20.1 98.0
Minor Importance 5 1.6 1.7 99.7
Not Important 1 .3 .3 100.0
Total 303 99.0 100.0




Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Very Important 218 71.2 71.9 71.9
Somewhat Important 72 23.5 23.8 95.7
Minor Importance 13 4.2 4.3 100.0
Total 303 99.0 100.0
Missing System 3 1.0
Total 306 100.0
Interest Rate for Credit Payment
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Very Important 227 74.2 74.7 74.7
Somewhat Important 48 15.7 15.8 90.5
Minor Importance 15 4.9 4.9 95.4
Not Important 14 4.6 4.6 100.0
Total 304 99.3 100.0
Missing System 2 .7
Total 306 100.0
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Terms for Return
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Very Important 201 65.7 66.6 66.6
Somewhat Important 85 27.8 28.1 94.7
Minor Importance 13 4.2 4.3 99.0
Not Important 3 1.0 1.0 100.0
Total 302 98.7 100.0
Missing System 4 1.3
Total 306 100.0
Terms for Cancelling Services
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Very Important 205 67.0 67.7 67.7
Somewhat Important 84 27.5 27.7 95.4
Minor Importance 13 4.2 4.3 99.7
Not Important 1 .3 .3 100.0
Total 303 99.0 100.0




Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Very Important 82 26.8 27.1 27.1
Somewhat Important 118 38.6 38.9 66.0
Minor Importance 81 26.5 26.7 92.7
Not Important 22 7.2 7.3 100.0
Total 303 99.0 100.0




Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Very Important 120 39.2 39.6 39.6
Somewhat Important 110 35.9 36.3 75.9
Minor Importance 60 19.6 19.8 95.7
Not Important 13 4.2 4.3 100.0
Total 303 99.0 100.0
Missing System 3 1.0
Total 306 100.0
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Disclaimers/Liability Waivers
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Very Important 147 48.0 48.4 48.4
Somewhat Important 109 35.6 35.9 84.2
Minor Importance 43 14.1 14.1 98.4
Not Important 5 1.6 1.6 100.0
Total 304 99.3 100.0
Missing System 2 .7
Total 306 100.0
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APPENDIX C: SECTION II, QUESTION 7, By GENDER
Participants were asked to "[t]hink generally about the times
when you have looked at contract terms at any point with respect to
your purchases of products or services. Were any of the terms impor-
tant to you?" Participant responses, broken down by gender, as to
how important they viewed arbitration terms are presented below.
Important Terms: Must Arbitrate Claims
Very Somewhat Minor Not
Important Important Importance Important
Gender Male Count 40 36 23 3 102
% within Gender 39.2% 35.3% 22.5% 2.9% 100.0%
% of Total 13.2% 11.9% 7.6% 1.0% 33.7%
Female Count 80 74 37 10 201
% within Gender 39.8% 36.8% 18.4% 5.0% 100.0%
% of Total 26.4% 24.4% 12.2% 3.3% 66.3%
Total Count 120 110 60 13 303
% within Gender 39.6% 36.3% 19.8% 4.3% 100.0%
% of Total 39.6% 36.3% 19.8% 4.3% 100.0%
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APPENDIX D: SECTION II, QUESTION 8
Participants were asked to "think broadly about how fair (using
your own sense of fairness) you view different contracts and purchase
terms, regardless of whether you have relevant personal experiences.
Please indicate how fair you view the following terms." Participant




Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Completely Fair 12 3.9 4.0 4.0
Usually Fair 80 26.1 26.9 31.0
Neutral 118 38.6 39.7 70.7
Usually Unfair 74 24.2 24.9 95.6
Completely Unfair 13 4.2 4.4 100.0
Total 297 97.1 100.0
Missing System 9 2.9
Total 306 100.0
Company Standard Form Contracts/Purchase Terms
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Completely Fair 8 2.6 2.7 2.7
Usually Fair 164 53.6 55.2 57.9
Neutral 102 33.3 34.3 92.3
Usually Unfair 20 6.5 6.7 99.0
Completely Unfair 3 1.0 1.0 100.0
Total 297 97.1 100.0
Missing System 9 2.9
Total 306 100.0
Employment Contracts and Handbooks
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Completely Fair 34 11.1 11.4 11.4
Usually Fair 170 55.6 57.0 68.5
Neutral 73 23.9 24.5 93.0
Usually Unfair 14 4.6 4.7 97.7
Completely Unfair 7 2.3 2.3 100.0
Total 298 97.4 100.0
Missing System 8 2.6
Total 306 100.0
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Loan Contracts
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Completely Fair 24 7.8 8.1 8.1
Usually Fair 132 43.1 44.4 52.5
Neutral 86 28.1 29.0 81.5
Usually Unfair 46 15.0 15.5 97.0
Completely Unfair 9 2.9 3.0 100.0
Total 297 97.1 100.0




Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Completely Fair 19 6.2 6.4 6.4
Usually Fair 134 43.8 45.0 51.3
Neutral 94 30.7 31.5 82.9
Usually Unfair 41 13.4 13.8 96.6
Completely Unfair 10 3.3 3.4 100.0
Total 298 97.4 100.0




Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Completely Fair 19 6.2 6.4 6.4
Usually Fair 152 49.7 51.0 57.4
Neutral 80 26.1 26.8 84.2
Usually Unfair 35 11.4 11.7 96.0
Completely Unfair 12 3.9 4.0 100.0
Total 298 97.4 100.0
Missing System 8 2.6
Total 306 100.0
Credit Card Contracts or Terms
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Completely Fair 18 5.9 6.1 6.1
Usually Fair 98 32.0 33.0 39.1
Neutral 78 25.5 26.3 65.3
Usually Unfair 84 27.5 28.3 93.6
Completely Unfair 19 6.2 6.4 100.0
Total 297 97.1 100.0
Missing System 9 2.9
Total 306 100.0
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Internet Contract/Purchase Terms
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Completely Fair 12 3.9 4.1 4.1
Usually Fair 120 39.2 40.5 44.6
Neutral 139 45.4 47.0 91.6
Usually Unfair 19 6.2 6.4 98.0
Completely Unfair 6 2.0 2.0 100.0
Total 296 96.7 100.0




Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Completely Fair 24 7.8 8.1 8.1
Usually Fair 160 52.3 53.9 62.0
Neutral 73 23.9 24.6 86.5
Usually Unfair 37 12.1 12.5 99.0
Completely Unfair 3 1.0 1.0 100.0
Total 297 97.1 100.0




Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Completely Fair 16 5.2 5.4 5.4
Usually Fair 94 30.7 31.8 37.2
Neutral 83 27.1 28.0 65.2
Usually Unfair 83 27.1 28.0 93.2
Completely Unfair 20 6.5 6.8 100.0
Total 296 96.7 100.0




Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Completely Fair 34 11.1 11.6 11.6
Usually Fair 87 28.4 29.6 41.2
Neutral 146 47.7 49.7 90.8
Usually Unfair 18 5.9 6.1 96.9
Completely Unfair 9 2.9 3.1 100.0
Total 294 96.1 100.0
Missing System 12 3.9
Total 306 100.0
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Contracts With Friends
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Completely Fair 26 8.5 8.8 8.8
Usually Fair 92 30.1 31.2 40.0
Neutral 151 49.3 51.2 91.2
Usually Unfair 15 4.9 5.1 96.3
Completely Unfair 11 3.6 3.7 100.0
Total 295 96.4 100.0
Missing System 11 3.6
Total 306 100.0
Dispute or Claim Settlement Agreement
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Completely Fair 17 5.6 5.8 5.8
Usually Fair 79 25.8 26.9 32.7
Neutral 131 42.8 44.6 77.2
Usually Unfair 60 19.6 20.4 97.6
Completely Unfair 7 2.3 2.4 100.0
Total 294 96.1 100.0
Missing System 12 3.9
Total 306 100.0
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APPENDIX E: SECTION III, QUESTION 7
Participants were asked if they "[h]ad seen or noticed anything
about 'arbitration' in any consumer purchase contract or terms."
Ever Seen or Noticed Arbitration in Consumer Contracts or Terms
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid No 151 49.3 50.5 50.5
Yes 148 48.4 49.5 100.0
Total 299 97.7 100.0
Missing System 7 2.3
Total 306 100.0
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APPENDIX F: SECTION III, QUESTION 7, By GENDER
Participants were asked if they "[hiad seen or noticed anything
about 'arbitration' in any consumer purchase contract or terms." Par-
ticipant responses, broken down by gender, are included below.
Ever Seen or Noticed Arbitration in Consumer Contracts or Terms
No Yes Total
Gender Male Count 47 54 101
% within Gender 46.5% 53.5% 100.0%
% of Total 15.7% 18.1% 33.8%
Female Count 104 94 198
% within Gender 52.5% 47.5% 100.0%
% of Total 34.8% 31.4% 66.2%
Total Count 151 148 299
% within Gender 50.5% 49.5% 100.0%
% of Total 50.5% 49.5% 100.0%
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APPENDIX G: SECTION III, QUESTION 6
Participants were asked to "[t]hink generally about any com-
plaints or disputes you have had regarding consumer purchases of
products or services. What, if any, terms have you found to be impor-
tant at some point with respect to a complaint or dispute?" Partici-
pant responses are presented below.
Price
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid No 245 80.1 80.1 80.1
Yes 61 19.9 19.9 100.0
Total 306 100.0 100.0
Warranties
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid No 132 43.1 43.1 43.1
Yes 174 56.9 56.9 100.0
Total 306 100.0 100.0
Fees/Penalties
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid No 192 62.7 62.7 62.7
Yes 114 37.3 37.3 100.0
Total 306 100.0 100.0
Interest Rate for Credit Payment
CumulativeFrequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid No 240 78.4 78.4 78.4
Yes 66 21.6 21.6 100.0
Total 306 100.0 100.0
Returning Items
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid No 153 50.0 50.0 50.0
Yes 153 50.0 50.0 100.0
Total 306 100.0 100.0
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!ancelline Service
Other (Yes/No)
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APPENDIX H: SECTION 3, QUESTION 1, By GENDER
Participants were asked to "focus again on your consumer
purchases and the form contracts or purchase terms you encounter
when buying consumer products and services. Roughly, how often do
you try to negotiate or change such form contracts or terms when you
purchase consumer products or services?" Participant responses, bro-
ken down by gender, are listed below.
How Often Change Contracts or Terms
Half the Nearly All
Never Rarely Sometimes Time Frequently the Time Total
Gender Male Count 26 28 31 6 7 3 101
% within Gender 25.7% 27.7% 30.7% 5.9% 6.9% 3.0% 100.0%
% of Total 8.6% 9.2% 10.2% 2.0% 2.3% 1.0% 33.3%
Female Count 89 55 34 8 12 4 202
% within Gender 44.1% 27.2% 16.8% 4.0% 5.9% 2.0% 100.0%
% of Total 29.4% 18.2% 11.2% 2.6% 4.0% 1.3% 66.7%
Total Count 115 83 65 14 19 7 303
% within Gender 38.0% 27.4% 21.5% 4.6% 6.3% 2.3% 100.0%
% of Total 38.0% 27.4% 21.5% 4.6% 6.3% 2.3% 100.0%
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APPENDIX I: SECTION 3, QUESTION 1B
Participants were asked, "What types of terms have you been




Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid No 47 29.7 29.7 29.7
Yes 111 70.3 70.3 100.0
Total 158 100.0 100.0
Warranties
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid No 117 74.1 74.1 74.1
Yes 41 25.9 25.9 100.0
Total 158 100.0 100.0
Fees/Penalties
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid No 97 61.4 61.4 61.4
Yes 61 38.6 38.6 100.0
Total 158 100.0 100.0
Interest Rate for Credit Payment
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid No 112 70.9 70.9 70.9
Yes 46 29.1 29.1 100.0
Total 158 100.0 100.0
Terms for Returning
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid No 118 74.7 74.7 74.7
Yes 40 25.3 25.3 100.0
Total 158 100.0 100.0
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APPENDIX J: SECTION III, QUESTION 3
Participants were asked to "[i]magine that you are shopping for a
car, and have found the one you think you want. The salesperson
gives you a 5 page contract with purchase terms, and asks you to sign
it in order to finalize the purchase. Please review the list of purchase
terms below, and check all the terms that you would want the sales-
person to explain to you." Participant responses are listed below.
Explain Price
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid No 84 27.5 27.5 27.5
Yes 222 72.5 72.5 100.0
Total 306 100.0 100.0
Explain Fees/Penalties
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid No 49 16.0 16.0 16.0
Yes 257 84.0 84.0 100.0
Total 306 100.0 100.0
Explain Interest Rate for Payment
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid No 76 24.8 24.8 24.8
Yes 230 75.2 75.2 100.0
Total 306 100.0 100.0
Terms for Return
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Explain Arbitration Requirements
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid No 135 44.1 44.1 44.1
Yes 171 55.9 55.9 100.0
Total 306 100.0 100.0
Explain Freebies/Incentives
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid No 157 51.3 51.3 51.3
Yes 149 48.7 48.7 100.0
Total 306 100.0 100.0
Explain Disclaimers/Liability Waivers
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid No 76 24.8 24.8 24.8
Yes 230 75.2 75.2 100.0
Total 306 100.0 100.0
Explain Boilerplate
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid No 179 58.5 58.5 58.5
Yes 127 41.5 41.5 100.0
Total 306 100.0 100.0
Explain Technical/Legal Words
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid No 122 39.9 39.9 39.9
Yes 184 60.1 60.1 100.0
Total 306 100.0 100.0
Explain Other (Yes/No)
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid No 300 98.0 98.0 98.0
Yes 6 2.0 2.0 100.0
Total 306 100.0 100.0
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APPENDIX K: SECTION III, QUESTION 3, By GENDER
Participants were asked to "[ilmagine that you are shopping for a
car, and have found the one you think you want. The salesperson
gives you a 5 page contract with purchase terms, and asks you to sign
it in order to finalize the purchase. Please review the list of purchase
terms below, and check all the terms that you would want the sales-
person to explain to you." Participant responses to the arbitration
question, broken down by gender, are listed below.
Explain Arbitration Requirements
No Yes Total
Gender Male Count 48 55 103
% within Gender 46.6% 53.4% 100.0%
% of Total 15.7% 18.0% 33.7%
Female Count 87 116 203
% within Gender 42.9% 57.1% 100.0%
% of Total 28.4% 37.9% 66.3%
Total Count 135 171 306
% within Gender 44.1% 55.9% 100.0%
% of Total 44.1% 55.9% 100.0%
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